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INTRODUCTION	  
This	  Submission	  responds	  to	  the	  Draft	  Report	  in	  the	  Inquiry	  into	  IP	  Arrangements	  published	  29	  April	  
2016	  (‘Draft	  Report’).	  In	  broad	  terms,	  we:	  
1. Support	   many	   of	   the	   goals	   of,	   and	   recommendations	   of,	   the	   Productivity	   Commission
expressed	  in	  the	  Draft	  Report;
2. Are	   concerned	   that	   some	   recommendations	   may	   not	   achieve	   the	   overall	   goals	   of	   the
Commission,	  or	  reflect	  misunderstandings	  of	  the	  statutory	  framework.
Individually	   and	   collectively	  we	  have	  extensive	  experience	   teaching	   and	   researching	   in	   intellectual	  
property	   law	  over	  many	  years,	  across	  all	  of	   the	  major	   IP	  systems.	  Some	  of	  us	  have	  participated	   in	  
past	   reviews	   on	   which	   the	   Draft	   Report	   builds	   and	  many	   of	   us	   have	   spent	   time	   working	   in	   legal	  
practice	   or	   acting	   as	   consultants.	   In	   addition,	  we	   are	   also	   authors	   of	   original	   copyright	  works	   and	  
users	   of	   copyright	  materials	   in	   the	   course	   of	   teaching,	   research	   and	   publication.	   This	   Submission	  
draws	  on	  our	  significant	  experience	  with,	  and	  published	  work	  on,	  various	  aspects	  of	  Australian	  and	  
international	  IP	  law.	  This	  response	  is	  structured	  by	  topic	  area,	  and	  around	  the	  recommendations	  and	  
requests	  for	  information	  in	  the	  Draft	  Report.	  	  
2	  
COPYRIGHT	  
Draft	   Finding	   4.1:	   Australia’s	   copyright	   system	   has	   expanded	   over	   time,	   often	   with	   no	  
transparent,	  evidence-­‐based	  policy	  analysis	  demonstrating	  the	  need	  for,	  or	  quantum	  of	  new	  
rights.	  	  
We	  agree	  with	  this	  finding.	  The	  comments	  made	  by	  the	  Productivity	  Commission	  apply	  not	  only	  to	  
the	   creation	   of	   new	   rights	   (for	   example,	   the	   communication	   to	   the	   public	   right	   and,	   especially,	  
performers’	  rights	  and	  ‘paracopyright’	  rights	  which	  were	  introduced	  (or	  expanded	  significantly)	  as	  a	  
result	   of	   the	   Australia-­‐United	   States	   Free	   Trade	   Agreement1)	   but	   also	   the	   extension	   of	   existing	  
provisions	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  1968	  (Cth).	  This	  includes,	  for	  example,	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  duration	  
of	  protection	  for	  published	  works	  and	  subject	  matter	  other	  than	  works	  in	  2005.	  In	  2000	  the	  Review	  
of	   Intellectual	  Property	  Legislation	  under	  the	  Competition	  Principles	  Agreement	   recommended	  that	  
no	   changes	   be	   made	   to	   the	   duration	   of	   copyright	   in	   Australia,	   a	   position	   that	   the	   government	  
adopted	   in	   its	   response	   to	   the	   review.	   Yet,	   four	   years	   later,	   the	   term	   of	   copyright	   was	   extended	  
under	   the	   AUSFTA.	   No	   equivalent	   user	   rights	   were	   introduced	   to	   offset	   the	   public	   cost	   of	   this	  
extension,	   such	   as	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   ‘fair	   use’	   provision,	   as	   exists	   in	   the	  United	   States.	   Additional	  
exceptions	   were	   introduced	   in	   2006,	   but	   did	   not	   provide	   any	   substantial	   protection	   for	   user	  
interests:	   they	   only	   served	   to	   permit	   practices	   already	   occurring	   in	   the	   community,	   and	   are,	  
moreover,	   now	   out	   of	   date	   (for	   example,	   ss	   111	   and	   109A	   regarding	   time	   and	   format	   shifting	  
respectively2)	   or	   created	   such	   a	   complex	   set	   of	   requirements	   that	   the	   exemption	   has	   proved	  
unworkable	  in	  practice	  (for	  example,	  s	  200AB3).	  	  
The	   introduction	   and	   revision	   of	   technological	   protection	   measure	   provisions	   designed	   to	   be	  
compliant	   with	   the	   AUSFTA	   pursuant	   to	   the	   Copyright	   Amendment	   Act	   2006	   (Cth)	   were	   also	   not	  
accompanied	  by	  any	  transparent,	  evidence-­‐based	  policy	  analysis	  demonstrating	  the	  need	  for	  these	  
provisions	   (and,	   in	   fact,	   were	   drafted	   directly	   contrary	   to	   a	   number	   of	   recommendations	   of	   the	  
Parliamentary	  Committee	  that	  did	  receive	  evidence	  on	  the	  appropriate	  shape	  of	  anti-­‐circumvention	  
law4).	   The	   same	   Act	   expanded	   criminal	   liability,	   again	   with	   no	   evidence-­‐based	   policy	   analysis	  
demonstrating	   a	   need	   for	   that	   expansion.	   Neither	   expansion	   of	   copyright	   rights	   has	   since	   been	  
reviewed	   to	  determine	  whether	   the	   goals	   stated	   for	   the	  2006	  Act	   have	  been	  achieved.	  These	   are	  
only	  a	  few	  examples,	  but	  they	  serve	  to	  further	  emphasise	  Finding	  4.1	  of	  the	  Draft	  Report.	  
We	  do	  not,	  however,	  agree	  with	  all	  comments	  by	  the	  Commission	  regarding	  scope	  or	  the	  absence	  of	  
a	  rationale	  for	  certain	  extensions	  of	  scope.	  In	  particular,	  whatever	  may	  be	  said	  about	  the	  economic	  
analysis	  which	  accompanied	  the	  introduction	  of	  moral	  rights,	  we	  do	  not	  agree	  that	  the	  rationale	  for	  
moral	   rights	   is	   ‘weak’	   for	   the	   following	   reasons.	   Firstly,	   moral	   rights	   underpin	   the	   foundation	   of	  
international	   copyright	   law	  dating	  back	   to	   the	  Berne	  Convention	   for	   the	  Protection	  of	   Literary	  and	  
1	   Australia-­‐United	   States	   Free	   Trade	   Agreement,	   signed	   18	   May	   2004,	   [2005]	   ATS	   1	   (entered	   into	   force	   1	  
January	  2005)	  (‘AUSFTA’).	  
2	   Difficulties	   applying	   these	   exceptions	   to	   current	   technologies	   are	   discussed	   in	   Australian	   Law	   Reform	  
Commission,	  Copyright	  and	  the	  Digital	  Economy,	  Report	  No	  122	  (2013)	  [10.8]–[10.15].	  
3	  See	  ibid	  [12.14]–[12.15],	  [12.21].	  
4	  House	  of	  Representatives	  Standing	  Committee	  on	  Legal	  and	  Constitutional	  Affairs,	  Parliament	  of	  Australia,	  
Review	  of	  Technological	  Protection	  Measures	  Exceptions	  (2006).	  
3	  
Artistic	  Works	  (1886)	  (‘Berne	  Convention’).	  There	  is	  considerable	  academic	  work	  on	  the	  rationale	  of	  
international	  copyright	  that	  should	  be	  acknowledged.5	   	  Secondly,	  there	   is	  some	  work	  by	  the	  noted	  
cultural	  economist	  Professor	  David	  Throsby	  on	  the	  moral	  rights	  of	  artists,	  including	  survey	  evidence	  
on	  infringement	  of	  moral	  rights;6	  there	  is	  also	  a	  respectable	  body	  of	  economic	  theory	  that	  recognises	  
the	  potential	  economic	  benefits	  of	  moral	  rights.7	  Correct	  attribution	  of	  authorship	  is	  integral	  both	  to	  
creators’	   ability	   to	   build	   their	   own	   reputation,	   and	   to	   reducing	   confusion	   and	   fraud	   regarding	  
authorship.	  Thirdly,	  there	  are	  well-­‐documented	  problems	  of	  false	  attribution	  and	  fraud	  in	  Indigenous	  
arts	   markets.	   The	   Senate	   Standing	   Committee	   on	   Environment,	   Communications,	   Information	  
Technology	  and	   the	  Arts,	  Parliament	  of	  Australia,	   Indigenous	  Art	  –	  Securing	   the	  Future:	  Australia’s	  
Indigenous	  Visual	  Arts	  and	  Craft	  Sector	   (2007)	  discussed	  the	  relevance	  of	  moral	   rights	  and	  respect	  
for	  Indigenous	  cultural	  protocols	  developed	  by	  the	  sector	  to	  redress	  problems	  that	  make	  Indigenous	  
artists	  and	  communities	  especially	  vulnerable	  to	  exploitation.	  Lastly,	  moral	  rights	  are	  also	  important	  
in	  other	  contexts:	  for	  example,	  to	  ensure	  research	  integrity	  as	  recognised	  by	  the	  Australian	  Code	  for	  
the	   Responsible	   Conduct	   of	   Research8	   and	   similar	   policies	   determining	   authorship	   and	   attribution	  
administered	  by	  universities.	  There	  is	  a	  need	  to	  appreciate	  the	  interplay	  between	  moral	  rights	  and	  
scholarly	  codes	  of	  conduct	  affecting	  Australian	  researchers	  funded	  by	  the	  NHRMC	  and	  other	  bodies.	  
Draft	   Finding	   4.2:	  While	   hard	   to	   pinpoint	   an	   optimal	   copyright	   term,	   a	  more	   reasonable	  
estimate	  would	  be	   closer	   to	  15	   to	  25	  years	  after	   creation;	   considerably	   less	   than	  70	  years	  
after	  death.	  
We	  endorse	  the	  finding	  that	  as	  an	  overall	  proposition	  the	  present,	  long	  copyright	  term	  is	  unjustified.	  
It	   is	   especially	   problematic	   in	   the	   present	   form	  where	   the	   same	   full	   exclusive	   rights	   extend	   to	   an	  
extraordinarily	  wide	  range	  of	  materials,	   for	  the	  entire	  copyright	  term,	  and	  where	  there	  are	   limited	  
exceptions	  to	  those	  rights.9	  We	  do	  not	  express	  a	  view	  on	  where	  the	  optimal	  term	  lies,	  or	  whether	  
the	  optimal	   term	  may	  differ,	   for	  example,	  as	  between	  different	   rights	   (such	  as	  moral	  vs	  economic	  
rights,	  rights	  of	  reproduction	  vs	  rights	  of	  adaptation,	  etc)	  or	  different	  subject	  matters	  (for	  example,	  
the	  appropriate	  term	  for	  software	  may	  be	  different	  from	  that	  for	  a	  work	  of	  literature).	  
Australia	   is	  constrained	  by	   international	  agreements	   in	  this	  area,	  for	  example	  both	  the	  multilateral	  
Berne	  Convention	   and	   the	  bilateral	   AUSFTA.	  However,	  we	   commend	   the	  Productivity	   Commission	  
for	  engaging	  in	  analysis	  on	  the	  term	  of	  copyright.	  It	  is	  hoped	  that	  one	  day	  such	  suggestions	  will	  result	  
5	  See	  Sam	  Ricketson	  &	  Jane	  Ginsburg,	  International	  Copyright	  and	  Neighbouring	  Rights:	  The	  Berne	  Convention	  
and	  Beyond	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2nd	  ed,	  2006).	  
6	  See	  David	  Throsby	  and	  BJ	  Thompson,	  But	  What	  Do	  You	  Do	  for	  a	  Living?:	  A	  New	  Economic	  Study	  of	  Australian	  
Artists	   (Australia	   Council,	   1994);	   David	   Throsby	   and	   Virginia	   Holster,	  Don't	   Give	   Up	   Your	   Day	   Job	   (Australia	  
Council,	   2003);	   David	   Throsby	   and	   Anita	   Zednick,	  Do	   You	   Really	   Expect	   to	   Get	   Paid?	   An	   Economic	   Study	   of	  
Professional	  Artists	  in	  Australia	  (Australia	  Council,	  2010).	  	  
7	  See,	  eg,	  Henry	  Hansmann	  and	  Marina	  Santilli,	   ‘Authors’	  and	  Artists’	  Moral	  Rights:	  A	  Comparative	  Legal	  and	  
Economic	  Analysis’	  (1997)	  26	  Journal	  of	  Legal	  Studies	  95;	  Michael	  Rushton,	  ‘The	  Moral	  Rights	  of	  Artists:	  Droit	  
Moral	  or	  Droit	  Pecunaire?’	  (1998)	  22	  Journal	  of	  Cultural	  Economics	  1.	  
8	  Available	  at	  https://www.nhmrc.gov.au/guidelines-­‐publications/r39.	  	  
9	  See	  generally	  Rebecca	  Giblin,	  ‘Reimagining	  Copyright’s	  Duration’,	  in	  Rebecca	  Giblin	  and	  Kimberlee	  Weatherall	  
(eds),	   What	   If	   We	   Could	   Reimagine	   Copyright?	   (ANU	   Press,	   forthcoming	   2016)	   (preprint	   available	   at	  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2561108).	  	  
4	  
in	  a	  more	  appropriate	  duration	  of	  copyright	  protection	  for	  both	  works	  and	  subject	  matter	  other	  than	  
works,	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  costs	  and	  impediments	  to	  users	  created	  by	  overly	  long	  protection.	  In	  
the	  shorter	  term	  we	  hope	  that	  the	  Commission’s	  finding	  that	  the	  current	  term	  is	  excessively	  long	  will	  
inform	   Australia’s	   stance	   in	   international	   discussions.	   Australia	   should	   not	   support	   any	   further	  
entrenchment	  of	  the	  current	  excessive	  copyright	  terms	  at	  an	  international	  level.	  
We	   also	   support	   such	   a	   finding	   because	   the	   excessive	   length	   of	   copyright	   terms,	   and	   the	   uneven	  
effects	   of	   their	   uniform	  duration,	   are	   also	   to	   a	   significant	   degree	   responsible	   for	   the	   need	   for	   far	  
more	  flexibility	  in	  permissible	  uses	  within	  these	  (excessive)	  terms.	  The	  case	  for	  flexible	  and	  generous	  
exceptions	  for	  fair	  use	  and	  for	  use	  of	  orphan	  works	  is	  made	  far	  stronger	  than	  it	  would	  be	  if	  copyright	  
terms	  were	  more	  moderate.	  	  	  
One	   area	   in	   which	   copyright	   terms	   could	   be	   reduced	   –	  or,	   more	   accurately,	   eliminated	   –	   while	  
staying	  within	  the	  constraints	  of	  international	  agreements	  is	  in	  relation	  to	  legislation,	  case	  law,	  and	  
other	   official	   documents	   of	   a	   legal	   or	   administrative	   nature,	   where	   the	   Berne	   Convention	   allows	  
national	  discretion	  as	   to	  whether	   copyright	   subsists.	  Australia	   is	  one	  of	  a	   relatively	   small	   group	  of	  
countries	   which	   provides	   for	   ‘Crown	   copyright’	   in	   such	   documents.	   The	   effects	   of	   this	   are	   often	  
restrictive	   of	   competition	   in	   the	   provision	   of	   legal	   information	   services.	   They	   create	   cumbersome	  
barriers	   to	   the	   use	   of	   such	   materials	   by	   end-­‐users	   such	   as	   authors.	   Historical	   monopolies	   in	   the	  
publication	  of	  such	  information	  under	  licence	  from	  government	  bodies	  and	  courts	  create	  significant	  
barriers	   to	   free	   access	   and	   provision	   of	   competitive	   services	   in	   relation	   to	   such	   fundamental	  
information	  as	  legislation	  and	  case	  law.	  The	  Copyright	  Law	  Review	  Committee,	  in	  its	  2005	  report	  on	  
Crown	  copyright,	  made	  the	  following	  recommendation:10	  	  
Recommendation	   4:	   The	   Committee	   recommends	   that	   copyright	   in	   certain	   materials	  
produced	  by	  the	   judicial,	   legislative	  and	  executive	  arms	  of	  government	  be	  abolished.	  Those	  
materials	  are:	  
• bills,	   statutes,	   regulations,	   ordinances,	   by-­‐laws	   and	   proclamations,	   and	   explanatory
memoranda	  or	  explanatory	  statements	  relating	  to	  those	  materials;
• judgments,	  orders	  and	  awards	  of	  any	  court	  or	  tribunal;
• official	  records	  of	  parliamentary	  debates	  and	  reports	  of	  parliament,	  including	  reports	  of
parliamentary	  committees;
• reports	   of	   commissions	   of	   inquiry,	   including	   royal	   commissions	   and	   ministerial	   and
statutory	  inquiries;	  and
• other	  categories	  of	  material	  prescribed	  by	  regulation.	  (paragraph	  9.38).
The	  Federal	  Government	  has	  never	  provided	  an	  official	  response	  to	  this	  Report.	  This	  area	  deserves	  
further	   investigation	   by	   the	   Commission,	   including	  measures	   to	   ensure	   that	   such	   abolition	   is	   not	  
frustrated	  by	  past	  or	  present	  contractual	  arrangements,	  licences	  or	  other	  monopolistic	  practices.	  
10	  Copyright	  Law	  Review	  Committee,	  Crown	  Copyright	  [2005]	  CLRC	  18,	  available	  at	  
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/lawreform/CLRC/2005/18.html.	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Draft	   Recommendation	   4.1:	   The	   Australian	   Government	   should	   amend	   the	   Copyright	   Act	  
1968	  (Cth)	  so	  the	  current	  terms	  of	  copyright	  protection	  apply	  to	  unpublished	  works	  
We	   endorse	   this	   recommendation	   and	   agree	   that	   ending	   perpetual	   protection	   for	   unpublished	  
works	   is	   long	   overdue.	  We	   believe	   that	   the	   current	   terms	   of	   protection	   should	   be	   introduced	   for	  
unpublished	  works,	  but	  with	   the	  proviso	   that	   there	  needs	   to	  be	   careful	   consideration	  both	  of	   the	  
impact	  of	  any	  changes	  on	  other	  provisions	  in	  the	  Copyright	  Act,11	  and	  of	  the	  issues	  addressed	  by	  s	  51	  
of	   the	  Copyright	  Act.	  Currently,	   s	  51	  provides	   for	   the	   reproduction	  or	   communication	  of	   copies	  of	  
unpublished	   works	   by	   libraries	   and	   archives,	   where	   more	   than	   50	   years	   has	   elapsed	   since	   the	  
calendar	   year	   of	   the	   death	   of	   the	   author.	   The	   supply	   of	   this	   reproduction,	   whether	   in	   hard	   or	  
electronic	  copy,	  must	  be	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  research	  or	  study.	  Section	  51	  operates	  to	  help	  alleviate	  
some	   of	   the	   issues	   created	   by	   both	   the	   problem	   of	   orphan	   works	   and	   the	   limited	   availability	   of	  
copies	  of	  unpublished	  literary,	  dramatic,	  musical	  or	  artistic	  works.	  	  
When	  the	  proposed	  fair	  use	  provisions	  are	  drafted,	  these	  issues	  will	  need	  careful	  consideration.	  This	  
could	  be	  achieved,	  for	  example,	  by	  making	  it	  presumptively	  fair	  for	  a	  third	  party	  such	  as	  a	  librarian	  or	  
researcher	   to	   make	   a	   copy	   of	   an	   unpublished	   work,	   where	   the	   object	   of	   that	   reproduction	   is	   to	  
facilitate	  research	  and	  study.	  
Draft	   Recommendation	   5.1:	   The	   Australian	   Government	   should	   implement	   the	  
recommendation	  made	   in	   the	   House	   of	   Representatives	   Committee	   report	   At	  What	   Cost?	  
IT	  pricing	  and	   the	   Australia	  tax	  to	  amend	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  1968	  (Cth)	   to	  make	  clear	  that	  
it	  is	  not	  an	   infringement	  for	  consumers	  to	  circumvent	  geoblocking	  technology.	  	  
The	   Australian	   Government	   should	   seek	   to	   avoid	   any	   international	   agreements	   that	  
would	  prevent	  or	  ban	  consumers	  from	  circumventing	  geoblocking	  technology.	  
We	   endorse	   this	   recommendation.	   However,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   recognise	   that	   the	   issue	   of	  
geoblocking	   is	   far	  broader	   than	   the	  adoption	  of	   some	   form	  of	   technology	   that	   stops	  an	  Australian	  
consumer	   from	   accessing	   overseas	   content,	   and	   thus	   the	   proposal	   to	   amend	   the	   Copyright	   Act	  
ultimately	  only	  addresses	  part	  of	  the	  problem.	  In	  its	  Draft	  Report,	  the	  Commission	  defines	  the	  term	  
‘geoblocking’	  as	   ‘a	  technology	   that	  restricts	  a	  consumer’s	  access	  to	  websites	  and	  digital	  goods	  and	  
services	  to	  within	  their	  ‘home	  market’	  (p	  126,	  emphasis	  added).	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  that	  definition,	  the	  
Report	  makes	  the	  following	  findings:	  ‘[g]eoblocking	  restricts	  a	  consumer’s	  access	  to	  digital	  products,	  
enabling	   rights	   holders	   and	   intermediaries	   to	   segment	   the	   Internet	   into	   different	   markets	   and	  
charge	   different	   prices	   (or	   offer	   different	   services)	   to	   consumers	   based	   on	   their	   location’	   and	  
geoblocking	  can	  be	  overcome	  by	  ‘consumers	  often	  us[ing]	  virtual	  private	  network	  services	  to	  mask	  
their	  online	  location,	  making	  it	  appear	  as	  if	  they	  are	  located	  overseas’	  (p	  19).	  
11	  The	  concept	  of	  publication	  is	  used	  throughout	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  1968	  (Cth),	  and	  amendments	  to	  implement	  
the	  proposal	  will	  have	  reverberations	  through	  the	  legislation	  –	  these	  can	  be	  readily	  addressed	  through	  careful	  
drafting.	   Several	   authors	   of	   this	   submission	   dealt	   with	   this	   question	   in	   detail	   in	   a	   submission	   to	   the	  
Department	   of	   Communications:	   Kimberlee	   Weatherall,	   Kathy	   Bowrey,	   Michael	   Handler	   and	   Isabella	  
Alexander	  Submission	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  Communications	  on	  exposure	  draft	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Amendment	  
(Disability	  and	  Other	  Access	  Measures)	  Bill	  2016	  (12	  February	  2016).	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In	   contrast,	   the	   IT	   Pricing	   Report12	   adopted	   a	   far	   broader	   definition	   of	   geoblocking,	   making	   it	  
apparent	   that	  many	   forms	   of	   geoblocking	   cannot	   be	   overcome	   simply	   by	   adopting	   a	   VPN.	   In	   the	  
hearings	  preceding	   the	  Report,	  Hamish	  McCormick,	  First	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	   the	  Office	  of	  Trade	  
Negotiations	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Trade	  (DFAT),	  described	  geoblocking	  as:	  
the	  use	  of	  internet	  addresses,	  credit	  card	  numbers	  or	  other	  means	  of	  electronic	  identification	  
to	  block	  internet	  sales	  and	  downloads	  of	  electronic	  products—for	  example	  music,	  games	  and	  
computer	  programs—based	  on	  the	  geographic	  location	  of	  the	  consumer.13	  
This	  definition	   recognises	   that	  geoblocking	   is	  not	   simply	   technological	   in	  nature,	  but	   implemented	  
via	  contractual	  and	  other	  mechanisms.	  	  
Consider	   the	   following	   example.	   In	   February	   2016	   a	   consumer	  wishes	   to	   view	  episodes	   of	   the	  US	  
comedy	  The	  Mindy	  Project	  online	  and	  will	  happily	  pay	  for	  the	  privilege	  to	  do	  so.	  Only	  season	  1	  of	  The	  
Mindy	  Project	  is	  available	  for	  purchase	  on	  the	  Australian	  iTunes	  Music	  Store.	  As	  a	  result,	  in	  February	  
2016	   one	   of	   the	   few	   options	   for	   viewing	   this	   television	   show	   is	   through	   a	   subscription	   to	   US	  
streaming	  service	  ‘Hulu’,	  which	  also	  produces	  The	  Mindy	  Project.	  The	  Hulu	  streaming	  service	  can	  be	  
accessed	  through	  any	  device	  with	  an	  Australian	  IP	  address.	  It	  is	  only	  when	  an	  Australian	  consumer	  is	  
required	   to	   enter	   the	   billing	   postcode	   for	   their	   credit	   card	   that	   the	   service	   will	   not	   accept	   a	  
consumer’s	  request	  for	  a	  subscription.	  	  
Image 1: US streaming service ‘Hulu’, accessed from a Sydney-based iPad with an Australian IP address. 
12	   House	   of	   Representatives	   Standing	   Committee	   on	   Infrastructure	   and	   Communications,	   Parliament	   of	  
Australia,	  At	  What	  Cost?	  IT	  Pricing	  and	  the	  Australia	  Tax	  (2013)	  (‘IT	  Pricing	  Report’).	  
13	  Ibid	  [2.24].	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Image 2: After making a subscription selection (limited commercial streaming for US$7.99 per month) the 
consumer is directed towards a details page. At this point there is still no indication that an Australian consumer 
will not be able to use this service. 
Image 3: The consumer is able to include all relevant information from an Australian credit card (subsequently 
removed for the purposes of this submission) but it is not until an Australian ‘zip code’ is entered (here, the 
relevant postcode for the University of New South Wales) that the streaming service will not accept the 
Australian consumer’s subscription. 
If	  an	  Australian	  subscription	  service	  picks	  up	  the	  content	  to	  make	  it	  available,	  the	  consumer	  may	  be	  
able	  to	  access	   it.	  Returning	  to	  the	  example	  of	  The	  Mindy	  Project,	  a	   few	  months	   later,	   from	  1	  April	  
2016,	  the	  consumer	  will	  be	  able	  to	  subscribe	  to	  the	  Australian	  streaming	  service	  ‘Presto’	  and	  access	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all	   episodes	   of	   The	   Mindy	   Project.14	   Until	   this	   point,	   however,	   the	   consumer	   is	   limited	   in	   their	  
options.	   Similarly,	   Australian	   consumers	   can	   use	   local	   computers	   with	   Australian	   IP	   addresses	   to	  
purchase	   content	   on	   the	   British	   iTunes	   Store	   without	   employing	   any	   technology	   designed	   to	  
circumvent	   UK	   geoblocking	   measures,	   and	   use	   British	   iTunes	   Store	   vouchers	   to	   pay	   for	   content.	  
However,	   in	   order	   to	   purchase	   a	   song,	   film	   or	   television	   program,	   the	   consumer	  must	   be	   able	   to	  
enter	  a	  UK	  billing	  address.	  This	  is	  possible	  if	  the	  consumer	  has	  a	  UK	  credit	  card	  and	  has	  access	  to	  a	  
service	   that	   will	   provide	   a	   UK	   billing	   address	   for	   such	   purposes.	   (The	   computer	   will	   also	   then	   be	  
‘locked’	  to	  the	  British	  iTunes	  Store	  for	  a	  certain	  period	  after	  that	  purchase.)	  
Australian	  consumers	  face	  frustrating	  delays,	  and	  not	  all	  desired	  US	  or	  UK	  content	  will	  ultimately	  be	  
made	   available	   on	   local	   services	   (for	   example,	   the	   only	  way	   to	  watch	  Game	   of	   Thrones	   legally	   in	  
Australia	  at	  or	  close	  to	  the	  time	  of	  release	  is	  to	  have	  a	  subscription	  to	  pay	  television	  service	  Foxtel).	  	  
In	  summary,	  geoblocking	  is	  more	  than	  a	  technological	  issue:	  identifying	  financial	  and	  other	  personal	  
data	  is	  used	  to	  facilitate	  this	  practice.	  In	  the	  Mindy	  Project	  example,	  the	  consumer	  wishes	  to	  pay	  for	  
access	   to	   the	   television	   show	   and	   has	   not	   adopted	   a	   VPN	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   view	   the	   content.	   The	  
immediate	  barrier,	   rather,	   is	   that	   the	  consumer	  has	  a	  non-­‐United	  States	  postcode	  associated	  with	  
her	  credit	  card,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  the	  consumer	  cannot	  access	  her	  desired	  content.	  This	  was	  recognised	  
in	   the	   IT	  Pricing	  Report	  where	   it	  was	   recommended	   ‘[t]hat	   the	  Australian	  Government	   investigate	  
the	  feasibility	  of	  amending	  the	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Act	  so	  that	  contracts	  or	  terms	  of	  service	  
which	   seek	   to	   enforce	   geoblocking	   are	   considered	   void.’15	   As	   a	   result,	   while	   we	   endorse	   Draft	  
Recommendation	  5.1,	  we	  note	  that	  it	  addresses	  only	  part	  of	  the	  issues	  raised	  by	  geoblocking.	  This	  is	  
an	  area	  where	  copyright,	  contract	  and	  competition	  law	  intersect	  and	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  dealt	  with	  in	  a	  
holistic,	  rather	  than	  piecemeal,	  manner.	  
Draft	   Recommendation	   5.2:	   The	   Australian	   government	   should	   repeal	   parallel	   import	  
restrictions	  for	  books	  in	  order	  for	  the	  reform	  to	  take	  effect	  no	  later	  than	  the	  end	  of	  2017.	  
We	  support	  the	  recommendation	  that	  the	  Australian	  Government	  should	  repeal	  the	  parallel	  import	  
restrictions	  for	  books	  as	  soon	  as	  is	  practicable.	  	  
In	  1977,	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  Australia	  noted	  that	  the	  parallel	  import	  provisions	  led	  to	  higher	  prices	  of	  
imported	  books	  in	  Australia,	  but	  observed	  that	  ‘[a]ny	  undesirable	  economic	  or	  cultural	  effects	  which	  
some	   may	   discern	   as	   flowing	   from	   this	   aspect	   of	   copyright	   protection	   are	   a	   matter	   for	   the	  
legislature.’16	  Since	  that	  time,	  as	  noted	  by	  the	  Commission,	  numerous,	  differently	  constituted	  bodies	  
have	   examined	   the	   provisions	   and	   the	   available	   evidence,	   and	   concluded	   that	   the	   costs	   of	   the	  
parallel	  import	  restrictions	  on	  Australians	  outweigh	  the	  benefits.	  These	  reviews	  include:	  
• Copyright	   Law	   Review	   Committee,	   The	   Importation	   Provisions	   of	   the	   Copyright	   Act	   1968
(1988)	  –	  recommending	  relaxation	  of	  the	  parallel	  import	  provisions;
14	   See	   https://www.foxtel.com.au/about/media-­‐centre/press-­‐releases/2016/presto-­‐becomes-­‐the-­‐australian-­‐
home-­‐to-­‐every-­‐episode-­‐of-­‐the-­‐mindy-­‐project.html.	  
15	  IT	  Pricing	  Report,	  above	  n	  13,	  p	  xiii	  (Recommendation	  10).	  
16	   Interstate	   Parcel	   Express	   Co	   Pty	   Ltd	   v	   Time-­‐Life	   International	   (Nederlands)	   BV	   [1977]	   138	   CLR	   534,	   555	  
(Stephen	  J).	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• Australian	   Competition	   and	   Consumer	   Commission,	   Potential	   Consumer	   Benefits	   of
Repealing	   the	   Importation	   Provisions	   of	   the	   Copyright	   Act	   as	   they	   apply	   to	   Books	   and
Software	   (1999)	   and	   Summary	   of	   the	   Commission’s	   March	   1999	   Report	   on	   the	   Potential
Consumer	  Benefits	  of	  Repealing	  the	  Importation	  Provisions	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  as	  they	  apply
to	  Books	  and	  Software	  –	   Including	  Price	  Updates	   for	  Books,	  Computer	  Software	  and	  Sound
Recordings	  (2001)	  –	  recommending	  repeal	  of	  importation	  provisions	  for	  books	  and	  software;
• Intellectual	   Property	   and	   Competition	   Review	   Committee,	   Review	   of	   Intellectual	   Property
Legislation	   under	   the	   Competition	   Principles	   Agreement	   (2000)	   (‘Ergas	   Report’)	   –
recommending	  repeal	  of	  the	  parallel	  import	  provisions	  relating	  to	  books;
• Productivity	  Commission,	  Restrictions	  on	  the	  Parallel	  Importation	  of	  Books,	  Research	  Report
(2009)	  –	  recommending	  parallel	  importation	  restrictions	  on	  books	  should	  be	  repealed;
• House	   of	   Representatives	   Standing	   Committee	   on	   Infrastructure	   and	   Communications,	   At
What	   Cost?	   IT	   Pricing	   and	   the	   Australia	   Tax	   (2013)	   –	   recommending	   repeal	   of	   all	   parallel
importations	  provisions;
• Competition	  Policy	  Review,	  Final	  Report	   (2015)	   (‘Harper	  Review’)	  –	   recommending	  parallel
importation	  restrictions	  on	  books	  and	  second	  hand	  cars	  should	  be	  removed,	  and	  that	  other
restrictions	   in	   the	  Copyright	   Act	   should	   be	   reviewed	   by	   an	   independent	   body	   such	   as	   the
Productivity	  Commission.
All	  of	  these	  reviews	  and	  reports	  considered	  a	  large	  number	  of	  submissions	  and	  a	  considerable	  body	  
of	   evidence	   provided	   to	   them	   both	   in	   favour	   of	   and	   against	   repealing	   the	   provisions.	   With	   the	  
exception	   of	   the	   CLRC	   in	   1988,	   which	   recommended	   relaxation	   of	   the	   parallel	   importation	  
restrictions	  rather	  than	  repeal,	  every	  detailed	  consideration	  on	  this	  question	  has	  concluded	  that	  the	  
evidence	   favours	   repeal	   of	   the	   provisions	   in	   relation	   to	   books,	   while	   the	   IT	   Pricing	   Report	   went	  
further	  and	  recommended	  repeal	  of	  restrictions	  for	  all	  genuine	  goods.	  
We	   acknowledge	   the	   concerns	   of	   Australian	   writers	   that	   have	   circulated	   in	   the	   press	   about	   the	  
potential	   impact	   on	   Australian	   publishers,	   but	   also	   note	   that	   much	   criticism	   is	   based	   on	  
misinformation	  about	  what	   is	  proposed	  as	  well	  as	  misunderstandings	  of	   the	   legal	  position	  outside	  
Australia.	   In	   particular,	   we	   reject	   the	   claim	   that	   the	   removal	   of	   parallel	   importation	   restrictions	  
‘removes	   an	   author’s	   ability	   to	   sell	   an	   exclusive	   licence	   to	   publish	   their	   work	   in	   Australia’.17	   As	  
Australian	  authors	  who	  publish	  with	  Australian	  publishers	  and	  as	  experienced	   intellectual	  property	  
lawyers	  we	  note	  that	  our	  ability	  to	  contract	  with	  publishers	  is	  not	  affected	  at	  all	  by	  the	  Productivity	  
Commission’s	  proposals	  on	  parallel	   importation.	  Further,	  we	  also	  reject	  the	  claim	  of	  the	  Australian	  
Publishers	  Association	  that	  there	  is	  any	  such	  thing	  as	  a	  right	  to	  ‘equitable	  remuneration	  ...	  as	  a	  key	  
part	  of	  Australia’s	  fair	  dealing	  provisions’.18	  	  
It	   is	  also	  untrue	  that	   ‘parallel	   importation	  rules	  are	   the	  global	   standard’.19	   	   International	   treaties	  –	  
including,	   most	   recently,	   the	   Trans-­‐Pacific	   Partnership	   Agreement	   (‘TPP’)	   but	   also	   including	   the	  
Agreement	   on	   Trade-­‐Related	   Aspects	   of	   Intellectual	   Property	   Rights	   (‘TRIPS	   Agreement’)	   –	   have	  
17	  Australian	  Publishers	  Association,	   ‘Call	   for	  Clarity	  on	  Territorial	   Copyright	   in	  Australia’	   (Media	  Release,	   25	  
May	  2016),	  http://www.publishers.asn.au/documents/item/406.	  	  
18	  Ibid.	  
19	  Richard	  Flanagan,	  ‘Books	  are	  Too	  Important	  to	  Be	  Left	  to	  Economists’,	  Sydney	  Morning	  Herald,	  2	  June	  2016.	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deliberately	   left	   the	   question	   of	   international	   exhaustion	   of	   rights	   to	   individual	   countries.20	   As	   a	  
result,	  positions	  vary	  around	   the	  world.	  But	   the	  assertion	   that	   ‘all	   great	   free	   trading	  nations	  –	  bar	  
none’21	  prohibit	  parallel	  importation	  is	  demonstrably	  incorrect.	  The	  European	  Union	  observes	  a	  rule	  
of	   intra-­‐European	   exhaustion	   of	   rights:	   when	   an	   IP	   owner	   sells	   or	   consents	   to	   the	   sale	   of	   goods	  
embodying	  their	  IP	  in	  any	  part	  of	  the	  EU,	  they	  thereby	  ‘exhaust’	  their	  rights,	  and	  cannot	  prevent	  the	  
goods	  from	  being	  transported	  to	  or	  resold	  throughout	  the	  28	  Member	  States	  of	  the	  EU.22	  Notably,	  in	  
the	  US,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court’s	  Kirtsaeng	  decision,	  a	  US	  copyright	  holder	  is	  not	  entitled	  
to	   prevent	   the	   importation	   into	   the	   US	   of	   ‘grey-­‐market’	   products	   manufactured	   for	   overseas	  
markets.23	  	  	  
We	  also	  suggest	   that	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  colonial	   copyright	  history	  could	  help	  address	   fear-­‐
mongering	   about	   this	   proposal.	   Copyright	   has	   always	   had	   territorial	   limits	   because	   domestic	   laws	  
were	   jurisdiction-­‐specific.	   In	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	   Australian	   readers	   were,	   to	   some	   extent,	  
looked	   after	   because	   British	   publishers	   produced	   special	   format	   ‘colonial	   editions’:	   reduced	   price	  
editions	   of	   works	   designed	   for	   the	   culture-­‐starved,	   ill-­‐educated	   colonials	   in	   South	   Africa,	   India,	  
Australia,	   New	   Zealand	   and	   Canada.	   Although	   international	   copyright	   protection	   developed	   from	  
1886	  with	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  Berne	  Convention,	  the	  United	  States	  did	  not	  sign	  this	  treaty.	   Instead,	  
the	   US	   adopted	   a	   bespoke	   international	   copyright	   law,	   the	   International	   Copyright	   Act	   of	   1891	  
(known	  as	  the	  Chace	  Act).	  For	  the	  first	  time,	  the	  US	  allowed	  for	  protection	  of	  the	  works	  of	  foreign	  
authors	  in	  the	  US,	  however	  there	  were	  technical	  formalities	  designed	  to	  protect	  American	  publishers	  
and	  printers	  from	  foreign	  competition.	  Works	  had	  to	  be	  type-­‐set	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  registered,	  
before	  publication,	  with	  the	  Copyright	  Office.	  It	  was	  noted	  at	  the	  outset	  that	  this	  would	  be	  difficult	  
for	   overseas	   authors	   and	  publishers	   to	   comply	  with.	   The	  Berne	  Convention	   and,	   in	   particular,	   the	  
need	  for	  compliance	  with	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  Chace	  Act	  encouraged	  the	  establishment	  of	  multi-­‐
national	   publishing	   companies.	   Alongside	   these	   came	   international	   literary	   agents,	   such	   as	   Curtis	  
Brown,	   who	   bought	   and	   sold	   international	   publishing	   and	   syndication	   rights	   for	   publishers	  
(particularly	   useful	   for	   smaller	   concerns	   without	   an	   American	   foothold),	   fostering	   trans-­‐Atlantic	  
trade.	  	  
The	  Australian	  book	  market	  was	  served	  by	  successful	  local	  publishers.	  However,	  because	  the	  world	  
division	   of	   territories	   followed	   the	   then-­‐established	   colonial	   markets,	   American	   titles	   came	   to	  
Australia	   and	   New	   Zealand	   via	   the	   United	   Kingdom.	   Australian	   publishers,	   such	   as	   Angus	   &	  
Robertson,	  also	  commissioned	  works	   locally.	  However	   they	  had	   little	   interest	   in	  pursuing	  overseas	  
opportunities.	  If	  they	  exported	  the	  works	  of	  Australian	  authors	  to	  the	  UK,	  they	  had	  to	  accept	  a	  ‘price	  
discount’	   in	   the	   foreign	   territory	  —	  the	   reverse	  of	   the	  colonial	  edition	  discount	  –	  which	  made	   the	  
idea	  of	  pursuing	  export	  markets	  unattractive.	  It	  made	  more	  sense	  for	  Australian	  writers	  to	  continue	  
with	   their	   historical	   colonial	   practice	   of	   contracting	   directly	   with	   overseas-­‐based	   publishers	   and	  
literary	  agents,	  as	  best	  they	  could.	  This	  dynamic	  stymied	  the	  development	  of	  independent	  Australian	  
publishing	  houses,	  also	  making	  the	  successful	  firms	  vulnerable	  to	  foreign	  take-­‐overs.	  
20	  TRIPS	  Agreement,	  art	  6;	  TPP,	  art	  18.11.	  	  
21	  Flanagan,	  above	  n	  19.	  
22	   See	  generally	   Lionel	  Bently	  and	  Brad	  Sherman,	   Intellectual	  Property	   Law	   (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  4th	  ed,	  
2014)	  12–15.	  	  





Under	   the	   modern	   internationalisation	   of	   copyright,	   price	   increases	   for	   imported	   books	   for	  
‘colonials’	   were	   inevitable	   as	   interest	   in	   producing	   special	   cut-­‐price	   ‘colonial	   editions’	   fell	   away.	  
Restrictions	  on	  parallel	   importation	  have	  ensured	  what	   is	  euphemistically	  called	   the	   ‘Australia	   tax’	  
applies	  to	  imported	  books.	  Lifting	  the	  final	  importation	  restrictions	  will	  remove	  a	  colonial	  legacy	  that	  
empowers	  multinational	  publishers.	   It	  will	  do	  nothing	   to	  affect	   the	  contractual	   rights	  of	  Australian	  
authors	   to	  decide	  what	   rights	   to	  assign	   to	  whom	   in	  Australia	  or	  overseas.	  Nor	   should	   it	  affect	   the	  
value	  of	  those	  rights	  in	  negotiating	  copyright	  agreements.	  
	  
Finally,	  we	  urge	   the	  Productivity	  Commission	   to	  also	   consider	  extending	   the	  availability	  of	  parallel	  
importation	   to	   cover	   legitimate	   importation	   of	   audio-­‐visual	   items,	   such	   as	   DVDs	   and	   computer	  
games,	   as	   well	   as	   dramatic	   works,	   artistic	   works	   and	   musical	   works	   (sheet	   music).	   Research	   by	  
Screen	  Australia	  showing	  the	  ever-­‐increasing	  annual	  deficit	  in	  audio-­‐visual	  trade	  serves	  to	  emphasise	  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  









Draft	   Recommendation	   5.3:	   The	   Australian	   Government	   should	   amend	   the	   Copyright	   Act	  
1968	  (Cth)	  to	  replace	  the	  current	  fair	  dealing	  exceptions	  with	  a	  broad	  exception	  for	  fair	  use.	  
	  
We	  agree	  that	  Australia’s	  current	  copyright	  exceptions	  are	  overly	  complex	  and	  insufficiently	  flexible,	  
and	  fail	  to	  allow	  a	  range	  of	  uses	  that	  cause	  no	  or	  limited	  harm	  to	  copyright	  owners	  and	  which	  have	  
benefits	   for	   society.	   We	   also	   agree	   that	   Australian	   law	   needs	   an	   open-­‐ended	   exception	   which	  
considers	  the	  benefits	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  uses	  when	  determining	  whether	  there	  is	  infringement.	  The	  
case	   for	   this	   reform	   has	   been	   repeatedly	  made,	   supported	   by	   extensive	   evidence,	   including	  most	  
recently	  by	  the	  Australian	  Law	  Reform	  Commission	  (‘ALRC’).25	  Again,	  we	  acknowledge	  the	  concerns	  
of	  authors	  and	  other	  individual	  creators	  expressed	  in	  media	  debate	  around	  the	  introduction	  of	  fair	  
use.	  Again,	  we	  consider	  that	  these	  concerns	  result	  from	  significant	  misunderstandings	  regarding	  how	  
fair	  use	  operates,	  and	  unjustifiable	  mistrust	  regarding	  the	  ability	  of	  Australian	  courts	  to	  apply	   legal	  
standards	  appropriately.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  See	  above	  n	  2.	  A	  number	  of	  us	  made	  submissions	  to	  the	  ALRC’s	  Copyright	  and	  the	  Digital	  Economy	  Inquiry	  in	  
2012-­‐13,	   all	   of	   which	   are	   available	   online:	   http://www.alrc.gov.au/inquiries/copyright-­‐and-­‐digital-­‐
economy/submissions-­‐received-­‐alrc.	  Two	  of	  the	  authors	  of	  this	  submission	  (Bowrey	  and	  Weatherall)	  were	  also	  






In	  our	  view,	  the	  appropriate	  solution	  to	  the	  problems	  identified	  by	  the	  Commission	  lies	  in	  the	  set	  of	  
recommendations	  by	  the	  ALRC	   in	   its	  Report	  No	  122,	  Copyright	  and	  the	  Digital	  Economy.	  The	  ALRC	  
recommended:	  
• An	  express	  statement	  that	  a	  fair	  use	  of	  copyright	  material	  does	  not	  infringe	  copyright;	  
• A	  non-­‐exhaustive	  list	  of	  the	  factors	  to	  be	  considered	  in	  determining	  whether	  the	  use	  is	  a	  fair	  
use	  (‘the	  fairness	  factors’),	  namely:	  
o The	  purpose	  and	  character	  of	  the	  use;	  
o The	  nature	  of	  the	  copyright	  material;	  	  
o The	  amount	  and	  substantiality	  of	  the	  part	  used;	  and	  
o The	   effect	   of	   the	   use	   upon	   the	   potential	   market	   for,	   or	   value	   of,	   the	   copyright	  
material;	  
• A	  non-­‐exhaustive	  list	  of	  illustrative	  uses	  or	  purposes	  that	  may	  qualify	  as	  fair	  use;	  	  
• Repeal	  of:	  
o The	  fair	  dealing	  exceptions;	  	  
o The	  current	  exceptions	  for	  format-­‐shifting	  and	  time-­‐shifting;	  
o The	  current	  exceptions	  for	  temporary	  uses	  and	  proxy	  web	  caching;	  
o Section	  200AB;	  and	  
o Certain	  other	  exceptions	  for	  educational	  uses	  (ss	  23,	  44,	  200);	  and	  
• Analysis	  of	  use	  of	  orphan	  works	  under	  the	  new	  fair	  use	  exception,	  but	  in	  addition,	  a	  further	  
limit	  on	  remedies	  where	  it	  is	  established	  that	  despite	  a	  reasonably	  diligent	  search,	  the	  rights	  
holder	  has	  not	  been	  found	  and	  as	  far	  as	  reasonably	  possible,	  the	  author	  has	  been	  attributed.	  	  
	  
In	   our	   view	   the	   ALRC’s	   recommendations	   constitute	   an	   integrated	   solution	   to	   the	   problems	  
identified	  by	  both	  the	  Productivity	  Commission	  and	  the	  ALRC.	  We	  prefer	   the	  drafting	  proposed	  by	  
the	   ALRC	   (including,	   notably,	   of	   the	   fairness	   factors)	   which	   both	   addresses	   the	   Commission’s	  
concerns	  and	  draws	  on	  Australia’s	  own	  well-­‐established	   jurisprudence	  and	  that	  of	  other	  countries,	  
and	  hence	  will	  contribute	  to	  ensuring	  sufficient	  guidance	  regarding	  the	  application	  of	  the	  exception.	  	  
	  
We	   do	   not	   agree	   that	   an	   objectives	   clause	   is	   needed,	   and	   nor	   do	   we	   agree	   that	   the	   purpose	   of	  
copyright	   law	   is	   to	   protect	   only	   against	   uses	   which	   would	   undermine	   commercial	   exploitation	  
occurring	  at	   the	   time	  of	   the	   infringement.	  Clearly	   the	  availability	  of	  copyright-­‐protected	  content	   is	  
an	   important	   consideration,	   but	   it	   is	   also	   a	   longstanding	   principle	   in	   copyright,	   reflected	   in	   the	  
various	   copyright	   treaties,	   that	   authors	   and	   creators	   have	  both	   economic	   interests	   in	   exploitation	  
and	  other	  ‘legitimate	  interests’,26	  which	  include	  the	  non-­‐economic	  interests	  reflected	  in	  moral	  rights	  
and	  free	  speech	  objectives.27	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Berne	  Convention,	  art	  9(2);	  TRIPS	  Agreement,	  art	  13.	  
27	  See,	  eg,	  IceTV	  Pty	  Ltd	  v	  Nine	  Network	  Australia	  Pty	  Ltd	  (2009)	  238	  CLR	  458,	  486	  [71]	  (Gummow,	  Hayne	  and	  
Heydon	  JJ)	  (‘A	  safer,	   if	  necessarily	   incomplete,	  guide	  when	  construing	  Pt	   III	  of	  the	  Act	   is	  the	  proposition	  that	  
the	   purpose	   of	   a	   copyright	   law	   respecting	   original	  works	   is	   to	   balance	   the	   public	   interest	   in	   promoting	   the	  
encouragement	  of	  “literary”,	  “dramatic”,	  “musical”	  and	  “artistic	  works”,	  as	  defined,	  by	  providing	  a	  just	  reward	  
for	   the	   creator,	   with	   the	   public	   interest	   in	  maintaining	   a	   robust	   public	   domain	   in	   which	   further	   works	   are	  





In	  our	  view	  the	  fairness	  factors	  identified	  by	  the	  ALRC	  allow	  all	  relevant	  considerations	  to	  be	  taken	  
into	  account	   (including	   those	  of	   concern	   to	  both	   right	  holders	   and	   the	  Commission).	   In	  particular,	  
issues	  of	  availability	  would	  clearly	  be	  of	  relevance	  when	  considering	  ‘the	  effect	  of	  the	  use	  upon	  the	  
potential	  market	  for,	  or	  value	  of,	  the	  copyright	  material’.	  For	  example,	  a	  use	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  fair	  
if	   it	   involves	  use	  of	  an	  out-­‐of-­‐commerce	  work.	  Consideration	  of	  market	  harm	  and	  potential	  market	  
harm	  appropriately	  protects	   the	  genuine	  economic	   interests	  of	   right	  holders,	  but	  does	  not	  require	  
that	  any	  potential	  for	  a	  licence	  precludes	  fair	  use.	  As	  the	  ALRC	  noted	  in	  its	  Final	  Report:	  
	  
When	  considering	  harm	  to	  the	  rights	  holder’s	  markets,	  the	  relevant	  markets	  are	  those	  that	  
are	  ‘traditional,	  reasonable	  or	  likely	  to	  be	  developed’.	   If	  a	  use	  fills	  a	  ‘market	  niche’	  that	  the	  
rights	  holder	  ‘simply	  had	  no	  interest	  in	  occupying’,	  then	  the	  fourth	  factor	  may	  not	  disfavour	  
fair	  use.28	  
	  
The	  ALRC	  also	  addresses	  orphan	  works	  through	  a	  two-­‐part	  proposal.	  Use	  of	  works	  where	  the	  owner	  
cannot	   be	   identified	   is	   inherently	  more	   likely	   to	   be	   fair,	   although	   it	  would	   not	  always	  be	   allowed	  
under	  fair	  use	  (since	  a	  range	  of	  factors	  must	  be	  considered,	  including	  the	  nature	  and	  purpose	  of	  the	  
use	  and	  the	  character	  of	  the	  work).	  In	  cases	  where	  a	  use	  is	  not	  fair,	  the	  ALRC	  proposes	  that	  remedies	  
ought	  to	  be	  limited	  in	  cases	  where	  there	  has	  been	  a	  reasonably	  diligent	  search	  for	  the	  owner.	  In	  our	  
view,	  the	  combination	  of	  these	  two	  proposals	  from	  the	  ALRC	  would	  address	  the	  problems	  identified	  
by	  the	  Commission.	  	  
	  
Finally,	  in	  relation	  to	  third	  party	  use,	  as	  the	  ALRC	  outlines	  in	  Chapter	  7	  of	  its	  Final	  Report,	  a	  fair	  use	  
exception	   is	   sufficiently	   flexible	   to	   accommodate	   fair	   third	   party	   uses,	   and	   the	   fairness	   factors	  
identified	  by	  the	  ALRC	  are	  ‘well	  suited	  to	  judge	  whether	  third	  party	  copying	  and	  other	  uses	  should	  
be	  held	  to	  infringe	  copyright’.29	  	  
	  
Specific	  issues	  with	  text	  and	  data	  mining	  
The	  Commission	  may	  also	  be	  interested	  in	  research	  not	  referenced	  in	  the	  Draft	  Report:	  Hargreaves	  
et	  al,	  Standardisation	  in	  the	  Era	  of	  Innovation	  and	  Technological	  Development,	  Notably	  in	  the	  Field	  of	  
Text	  and	  Data	  Mining:	  Report	  from	  the	  Expert	  Group	  (2014).30	  This	  report	  examined	  the	  use	  of,	  and	  
potential	   economic	   value	  of,	   data	  mining	   for	   the	  European	  Union.	   The	   report	   concluded	   that	   text	  
and	   data	   mining	   has	   significant	   potential	   value	   in	   terms	   of	   improving	   research	   productivity	   and	  
discoveries.	   It	  also	   found	  evidence	   that	  data	  and	  text	  mining	  were	  more	  prevalent	   in	  US	  research,	  
attributing	   this	   difference,	   in	   part,	   to	   the	   existence	   of	   fair	   use.	   This	   is	   another	   example	   of	   the	  
potential	  societal	  and	  economic	  benefits	  of	  introducing	  fair	  use.	  However,	  care	  must	  also	  be	  taken	  to	  
protect	  the	  legitimate	  interests	  of	  those	  who	  provide	  text	  and	  data	  for	  free	  public	  access	  (usually	  via	  
the	  Internet)	  but	  who	  explicitly	  refuse	  to	  allow	  text/data	  mining,	  indicating	  this	  by	  means	  such	  as	  the	  
Robot	  Exclusion	  Protocol.	  Data	  mining	  of	   text/data	  can	  very	  easily	  be	  a	  means	  of	  extracting	  value-­‐
added	   elements	   from	   well-­‐organised	   text:	   simply	   free-­‐riding	   rather	   than	   ‘improving	   research	  
productivity	  and	  discoveries’.	  We	  believe	  that	  these	  considerations	  could	  be	  accommodated	  within	  
the	  ALRC’s	  proposed	  drafting	  of	  the	  fair	  use	  exception.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Above	  n	  2,	  [5.86].	  
29	  Ibid	  [7.2].	  







The	  special	  problem	  of	  colonial	  Indigenous	  collections	  
Due	   to	   the	   historic	   circumstances	   of	   the	  making	   of	   the	   work,	   copyright	   ownership	   in	   Indigenous	  
knowledge	   is	   often	   vested	   in	   a	   third	   party.	   Copyright	   practices	   of	   attribution	   can,	   in	   such	   cases,	  
involve	  what	  is	  from	  a	  cultural	  perspective,	  an	  act	  of	  wrongful	  attribution	  that	  causes	  serious	  cultural	  
offence.	   In	   recognition	   of	   this	   problem	   publicly	   funded	   Australian	   institutional	   collections	   often	  
adhere	  to	  Indigenous	  protocols	  that	  regulate	  appropriate	  access	  conditions	  for	  utilisation	  of	  material	  
concerning	  Indigenous	  Peoples.	  	  
Crafting	  of	  the	  fair	  use	  exception	  needs	  to	  respect	  and	  support	  the	  important	  work	  already	  achieved	  
in	   better	   reconciling	   Australian	   law	   with	   contemporary	   expectations	   in	   recognising	   the	   rights	   of	  
Aboriginal	   and	   Torres	   Strait	   Islander	   peoples.	   These	   efforts	   are	   supported	   by	   international	   law	   to	  
which	  Australia	   is	   a	   signatory	   such	  as	   the	  United	  Nations	  Declaration	  of	   Indigenous	  Rights	   (2007).	  
Article	  31	  provides:	  
	  
Indigenous	   peoples	   have	   the	   right	   to	   maintain,	   control,	   protect	   and	   develop	   their	  
cultural	  heritage,	   traditional	   knowledge	  and	   traditional	  cultural	  expressions,	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  manifestations	   of	   their	   sciences,	   technologies	   and	   cultures,	   including	   human	   and	  
genetic	   resources,	   seeds,	   medicines,	   knowledge	   of	   the	   properties	   of	   fauna	   and	   flora,	  
oral	   traditions,	   literatures,	   designs,	   sports	   and	   traditional	   games	   and	   visual	   and	  
performing	   arts.	   They	   also	   have	   the	   right	   to	   maintain,	   control,	   protect	   and	   develop	  
their	   intellectual	   property	   over	   such	   cultural	   heritage,	   traditional	   knowledge,	   and	  
traditional	  cultural	  expressions.	  
	  
Under	  a	  fair	  use	  regime,	  in	  assessing	  fairness,	  it	  should	  be	  presumptively	  unfair	  to	  provide	  access	  on	  
terms	  that	  are	  inconsistent	  with	  existing	  Indigenous	  cultural	  protocols	  adopted	  by	  Australian	  cultural	  
institutions	   and	   supported	   by	   international	   law	   to	  which	   Australia	   is	   a	   signatory.	  We	   believe	   that	  
these	   considerations	   could	   be	   accommodated	  within	   the	  ALRC’s	   proposed	  drafting	   of	   the	   fair	   use	  
exception,	   especially	   when	   supported	   by	   appropriate	   recognition	   of	   this	   issue	   in	   materials	  
accompanying	  legislation.	  
	  
Information	   request	   5.1:	   Other	   than	   for	   libraries	   and	   archives,	   to	   what	   extent	   are	  
copyright	   licence	   conditions	   being	   used	   by	   rights	   holders	   to	   override	   the	   exceptions	   in	  
the	   Copyright	   Act	   1968	   (Cth)?	   To	   what	   extent	   (if	   any)	   are	   these	   conditions	   being	  
enforced	  and	  what	  are	   the	   resulting	  effects	  on	  users?	  
Would	   amendments	   to	   the	   Copyright	   Act	   1968	   (Cth)	   to	   preserve	   exceptions	   for	   digital	  
material	  have	  any	  unintended	  impacts?	  
	  
We	  are	  aware	  of	  a	  number	  of	  circumstances	  in	  which	  copyright	  licence	  conditions	  are	  regularly	  used	  
to	  override	  exceptions	  or	  impose	  conditions	  not	  supported	  by	  copyright	  law.	  	  
Standard	  commercial	  publisher	  agreements	  
Standard	   academic	   publisher	   agreements	   require	   authors	   to	   clear	   copyright	   on	   a	   wide	   range	   of	  





two	  legal	  issues	  here.	  First,	  if	  the	  author’s	  use	  involves	  less	  than	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  the	  copyright	  
material	   it	   will	   not	   constitute	   an	   infringement.	   Secondly,	   even	   where	   a	   use	   may	   be	   prima	   facie	  
infringing,	  it	  may	  come	  under	  the	  existing	  fair	  dealing	  exception	  for	  research	  and	  study.	  	  
An	  example	  of	  an	  approach	  taken	  by	  a	  publisher	  can	  be	  seen	  on	  Wiley’s	  ‘Copyright	  and	  Permissions’	  
page,	  which	  relevantly	  provides:	  
	  
More	  specifically,	  you	  should	  always	  secure	  permission	  for:	  
1.	  A	  single	  quotation	  or	  several	  shorter	  quotes	  from	  a	  full-­‐length	  book,	  more	  than	  300	  words	  
in	  toto.	  
2.	  A	  single	  quotation	  of	  more	  than	  50	  words	  from	  a	  newspaper,	  magazine,	  or	  journal.	  
3.	  Artwork,	  photographs,	  or	  forms,	  whether	  or	  not	  from	  a	  published	  source.	  Sometimes	  more	  
than	  one	  permission	  is	  required	  for	  a	  photograph,	  e.g.,	  from	  the	  photographer	  and	  also	  from	  
the	  creator	  of	  the	  underlying	  work	  shown	  in	  the	  photograph.	  
4.	   Charts,	   tables,	   graphs,	   and	   other	   representations	   where,	   inevitably,	   you	   are	   using	   the	  
entire	   representation,	   since	   the	   copyrighted	   features	   are	   complete	   in	   themselves	   and	  
inherent	  in	  the	  whole	  work.	  
5.	  Material	  which	  includes	  all	  or	  part	  of	  a	  poem	  or	  song	  lyric	  (even	  as	  little	  as	  one	  line),	  or	  the	  
title	  of	  a	  song.	  
6.	   Computer	   representations,	   such	   as	   the	   depiction	   of	   results	   of	   research	   on	   computerized	  
databases,	  the	  on-­‐screen	  output	  of	  software,	  reproduction	  of	  web	  pages,	  and	  the	  capture	  of	  
Internet	  or	  other	  online	  screen	  shots.31	  
	  	  
Whilst	  there	  may	  be	  a	  reference	  to	  fair	  use	  rights	  on	  the	  general	   information	  provided	  to	  authors,	  
the	   contract	   received	   usually	   specifies	   that	   clearance	   is	   required,	   regardless	   of	   whether	   this	   is	  
actually	   required	   by	   law.	   Often,	   at	   the	   point	   of	   (electronic)	   submission,	   academic	   authors	   are	  
required	   to	   certify	   that	   they	   already	   have	   permission	   for	   any	   copyright	   material	   included	   in	   a	  
manuscript	   (with	   submission	   impossible	  until	   the	   relevant	  box	   is	   checked	  on	   the	  electronic	   form).	  
Further,	   contracts	  usually	   include	  a	   clause	  whereby	   the	  author	  has	   to	   indemnify	   the	  publisher	   for	  
any	   costs	   associated	   with	   a	   failure	   to	   clear	   copyright	   material.	   Accordingly,	   agreeing	   to	   these	  
contractual	   conditions	   and	   clearing	   material	   when	   this	   is	   not	   required	   by	   copyright	   law	   is	   very	  
common.	  Researchers	  require	  timely	  publication	  and	  do	  not	  want	  to	  cause	  unnecessary	  delays,	  and	  
few	  are	  confident	  or	  knowledgeable	  enough	  to	  assert	  their	  fair	  dealing	  or	  fair	  use	  rights.	  The	  ALRC’s	  
discussion	  of	   a	   right	  of	  quotation	  and	   illustration	   is	   relevant	   to	   this	  point.	   Impacts	  of	   this	  practice	  
include	  (a)	  significant	  time	  wasted	  by	  academic	  researchers	  (and	  spending	  of	  scarce	  research	  grant	  
resources)	   seeking	   permission	   that	   ought	   not	   be	   required,	   and/or	   (b)	   distortion	   of	   the	   content	   of	  
research	  and	  teaching	  publications	  as	  material	  is	  removed	  (especially	  pictures,	  but	  also	  text	  quotes)	  
in	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  need	  to	  obtain	  unnecessary	  clearances.	  	  
	  
Reform	  is	  needed	  to	  redress	  this	  common	  contractual	  licensing	  problem	  facing	  authors.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






Standard	  e-­‐book	  platforms	  use	   technological	  measures	   to	   restrict	   user	   access.	   For	   example,	   these	  
might	  limit	  the	  number	  of	  pages	  that	  can	  be	  printed,	  disable	  the	  ability	  to	  download	  or	  cause	  access	  
to	  be	  timed	  out.	  Often,	  these	  controls	  mean	  that	  users	  experience	  far	  greater	  restrictions	  than	  they	  
would	  have	  experienced	  in	  using	  a	  hard	  copy	  of	  the	  work	  because	  there	  is	  an	  arbitrary	  technological	  
determination	  of	   fair	  dealing	   rights,	   regardless	  of	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  content	  or	  context	  of	   the	  use.	  
Thus,	  while	  access	  to	  e-­‐books	  is	  often	  preferable	  to	  hard	  copy,	  as	  delivery	  is	  more	  timely,	  restrictions	  
on	   how	   the	   works	   can	   be	   used	   can	   make	   e-­‐books	   a	   poor	   substitute	   for	   hard	   copies.32	   These	  
measures	  frustrate	  the	  user’s	  research	  and	  impede	  the	  efficiency	  anticipated	  by	  existing	  fair	  dealing	  
exceptions	  operating	  in	  a	  hard	  copy	  world.	  The	  technological	  controls	  operate	  in	  conjunction	  with	  e-­‐
book	  licence	  conditions	  agreed	  to	  by	  libraries.	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  a	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  Weatherall,	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Draft	  Recommendation	  6.1:	  The	  Australian	  Government	  should	  amend	  ss.	  7(2)	  and	  7(3)	  of	  
the	   Patents	  Act	   1990	   (Cth)	   such	   that	   an	   invention	   is	   taken	   to	   involve	   an	   inventive	   step	   if,	  
having	  regard	  to	  the	  prior	  art	  base,	  it	  is	  not	  obvious	  to	  a	  person	  skilled	  in	  the	  relevant	  art.	  
	  
We	  endorse	  amendment	  of	  the	  inventive	  step	  test	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  its	  stringency,	  and	  agree	  that	  
alignment	   of	   Australian	   law	  with	   the	   approach	   adopted	   by	   the	   European	   Patent	   Office	   would	   be	  
appropriate.	  Not	  only	  would	  this	  assist	  in	  raising	  the	  threshold	  of	  the	  inventive	  step	  test,	  it	  would	  to	  
some	  extent	  bring	   the	   test	   in	   line	  with	   that	  of	  major	   trading	  partners.	  However,	  we	  do	  not	   see	   a	  
need	  to	  stipulate	  the	  content	  of	  the	  Explanatory	  Memorandum	  accompanying	  such	  an	  amendment.	  
Rules	  of	  statutory	  interpretation	  refer	  judges	  to	  the	  Explanatory	  Memorandum	  where	  the	  meaning	  
of	  a	  provision	  is	  unclear.	  
	  
We	   recognise	   that	   stakeholders	   might	   query	   whether	   further	   amendment	   of	   Australian	   law	   is	  
needed	  to	  raise	  the	   inventive	  step	  threshold,	  given	  that	  changes	  were	  made	  relatively	  recently	  via	  
the	  Intellectual	  Property	  Laws	  Amendment	  (Raising	  The	  Bar)	  Act	  2012	  (Cth)	  (‘RTB	  Act’).	  The	  RTB	  Act	  
resulted	   in	   an	   expansion	   of	   the	   information	   base	   against	   which	   an	   invention’s	   inventive	   step	   is	  
assessed.	   We	   were	   and	   continue	   to	   be	   fully	   supportive	   of	   those	   amendments.	   Inventive	   step	   is	  
however	   a	   function	   both	   of	   the	   prior	   art	   base	   against	   which	   a	   patent	   is	   assessed,	   and	   the	   tests	  
applied	  to	  determine	  whether,	  when	  assessed	  against	  that	  base,	  the	  invention	  is	  ‘obvious’.	  The	  RTB	  
Act	  did	  not	  address	  this	  second	  aspect	  of	  the	   inventive	  step	  threshold,	  although	  Proposal	  4.3	  of	   IP	  
Australia’s	  earlier	   ‘Getting	  the	  Balance	  Right’	  Consultation	  Paper	  would	  have	  done	  so.	  As	  stated	   in	  
Nicol’s	   earlier	   submission	   to	   that	   consultation,	   the	   proposed	   terminology	   of	   ‘obvious	   to	   try’	   and	  
‘reasonable	   expectation	   of	   success’	   was	   at	   that	   time	   in	   line	   with	   other	   jurisdictions	   and	   Nicol	  
supported	  this	  formulation.	  	  
	  
In	  our	  view,	  the	  RTB	  Act	  is	  unlikely	  to	  bring	  the	  Australian	  threshold	  for	  inventiveness	  into	  line	  with	  
the	  law	  in	  our	  major	  trading	  partners,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  inventive	  step	  test	  by	  
the	   High	   Court	   in	  Aktiebolaget	   Hässle	   v	   Alphapharm	   Pty	   Ltd33	   and	   the	   Court’s	   affirmation	   of	   this	  
approach	  for	  applying	  the	  inventive	  step	  test	  under	  the	  Patents	  Act	  1990	  (Cth)	  in	  Lockwood	  Security	  
Products	  Pty	   Ltd	   v	  Doric	  Products	  Pty	   Ltd	   [No	  2].34	   There	  was	  a	   time	  when	   the	  Australian	  position	  
regarding	  inventive	  step	  was	  in	  line	  with	  that	  in	  the	  US	  regarding	  non-­‐obviousness.	  This	  changed	  as	  a	  
result	   of	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	   non-­‐obviousness	   requirement	   in	   the	   US	   brought	   about	   by	   the	  
Supreme	  Court’s	   decision	   in	  KSR	   International	   Co	   v	   Teleflex,	   Inc,35	   as	   illustrated	   in	   the	   subsequent	  
body	  of	   jurisprudence	   that	  built	  up	   in	   specific	   areas	  of	   technology.	   In	  biotechnology,	   for	  example,	  
the	  US	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  for	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	  held	  in	  In	  re	  Kubin36	  that	  isolation	  of	  the	  claimed	  gene	  
sequences	  was	  obvious	  to	  try,	  in	  line	  with	  KSR	  reasoning	  but	  in	  contrast	  to	  In	  re	  Deuel,37	  which	  until	  
then	   had	   been	   the	   leading	   case	   on	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	   inventive	   step	   requirement	   for	  
biotechnology	   inventions.	  With	   the	   closer	  alignment	  of	   the	  US	  position	   to	   that	   in	  Europe,	  we	   saw	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  [2002]	  HCA	  59;	  (2002)	  212	  CLR	  411.	  
34	  [2007]	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  21;	  (2007)	  235	  CLR	  173.	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  US	  398	  (2007).	  
36	  561	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  Cir,	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that	   there	   was	   good	   justification	   for	   Australia	   to	   take	   a	   similar	   step	   when	   this	   issue	   was	   under	  
consideration	   in	  2011.	  The	   terminology	  of	   ‘obvious	   to	   try’	  and	   ‘reasonable	  expectation	  of	   success’	  
used	  in	  the	  ‘Getting	  the	  Balance	  Right’	  Consultation	  Paper	  was,	  in	  our	  view,	  appropriate.	  	  
	  
Since	   our	   submissions	   relating	   to	   the	   Raising	   The	   Bar	   amendments	   in	   2011,	   a	   series	   of	   other	  
influential	   inventive	   step	   cases	   have	   been	   decided	   (albeit	   still	  mostly	   considering	   the	   pre-­‐RTB	  Act	  
requirements).	  One	  notable	  case	  is	  Generic	  Health	  Pty	  Ltd	  v	  Bayer	  Pharma	  Aktiengesellschaft.38	  We	  
draw	  particular	  attention	  to	  the	  last	  two	  sentences	  in	  paragraph	  71,	  where	  the	  unanimous	  Full	  Court	  
of	  the	  Federal	  Court	  held	  that:	  	  
	  
we	   think	   a	   test	   formulated	   in	   terms	   of	   worthwhile	   to	   try	   was	   firmly	   rejected	   by	   the	   High	  
Court	   in	  Alphapharm	   (see	  also	  Pfizer	   [Overseas	  Pharmaceuticals	   v	  Eli	   Lilly	  &	  Co	   (2005)	  225	  
ALR	   416]	   at	   476,	   [287],	   per	   French	   and	   Lindgren	   JJ).	   The	   fact	   (if	   it	   be	   the	   fact)	   that	   the	  
position	  in	  the	  United	  States	  may	  have	  shifted	  does	  not	  affect	  the	  binding	  nature	  of	  what	  the	  
plurality	  said	  in	  Alphapharm.	  
	  
In	  the	  High	  Court’s	  decision	  in	  AstraZeneca	  AB	  v	  Apotex	  Pty	  Ltd,39	  although	  the	  primary	  focus	  was	  on	  
the	  person	  skilled	  in	  the	  art,	  the	  court	  addressed	  the	  question	  of	  obviousness	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  
as	  the	  Full	  Federal	  Court	  in	  Generic	  Health.	  In	  particular,	  French	  CJ	  and	  Kiefel	  J	  summarised	  the	  law	  
at	  paragraph	  15:	  
	  
Relevant	   content	  was	   given	   to	   the	   term	   ‘obvious’	   by	   Aickin	   J	   in	  Wellcome	   Foundation	   Ltd,	  
posing	  as	  the	  test:40	  
whether	  the	  hypothetical	  addressee	  faced	  with	  the	  same	  problem	  would	  have	  taken	  
as	   a	   matter	   of	   routine	   whatever	   steps	   might	   have	   led	   from	   the	   prior	   art	   to	   the	  
invention,	  whether	  they	  be	  the	  steps	  of	  the	  inventor	  or	  not.	  
	  
The	  idea	  of	  steps	  taken	  ‘as	  a	  matter	  of	  routine’	  did	  not,	  as	  was	  pointed	  out	  in	  AB	  Hässle,	  include	  ‘a	  
course	  of	  action	  which	  was	  complex	  and	  detailed,	  as	  well	  as	  laborious,	  with	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  trial	  and	  
error,	  with	  dead	  ends	  and	  the	  retracing	  of	  steps’.41	  The	  question	  posed	  in	  AB	  Hässle	  was	  whether,	  in	  
relation	  to	  a	  particular	  patent,	  putative	  experiments,	  leading	  from	  the	  relevant	  prior	  art	  base	  to	  the	  
invention	  as	  claimed,	  are	  part	  of	  the	  inventive	  step	  claimed	  or	  are	  ‘of	  a	  routine	  character’	  to	  be	  tried	  
‘as	  a	  matter	  of	  course’.42	  That	  way	  of	  approaching	  the	  matter	  was	  said	  to	  have	  an	  affinity43	  with	  the	  
question	  posed	  by	  Graham	  J	  in	  Olin	  Mathieson	  Chemical	  Corporation	  v	  Biorex	  Laboratories	  Ltd.44	  The	  
question	  posed	  was	  described	  in	  AB	  Hässle	  as	  a	  reformulation	  of	  the	  ‘Cripps	  question’	  —	  a	  reference	  
to	  the	  question	  set	  out	  in	  Sharp	  &	  Dohme	  Inc	  v	  Boots	  Pure	  Drug	  Co	  Ltd.45	  The	  question,	  stripped	  of	  
references	  specific	  to	  the	  case	  before	  Graham	  J,	  can	  be	  framed	  as	  follows:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  [2014]	  FCAFC	  73;	  (2014)	  222	  FCR	  336.	  
39	  [2015]	  HCA	  30;	  (2015)	  323	  ALR	  605.	  
40	  (1981)	  148	  CLR	  262,	  286.	  
41	   Aktiebolaget	   Hässle	   v	   Alphapharm	   Pty	   Ltd	   [2002]	   HCA	   59;	   (2002)	   212	   CLR	   411,	   436	   [58]	   (Gleeson	   CJ,	  
Gaudron,	  Gummow	  and	  Hayne	  JJ).	  
42	  Ibid	  433	  [52].	  
43	  Ibid	  433	  [53].	  
44	  [1970]	  RPC	  157,	  187–8.	  
45	  (1928)	  45	  RPC	  153,	  173.	  
20	  
Would	   the	   notional	   research	   group	   at	   the	   relevant	   date,	   in	   all	   the	   circumstances,	   which	  
include	  a	  knowledge	  of	  all	  the	  relevant	  prior	  art	  and	  of	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  nature	  and	  success	  of	  
[the	  existing	  compound],	  directly	  be	   led	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  course	   to	   try	   [the	  claimed	   inventive	  
step]	  in	  the	  expectation	  that	  it	  might	  well	  produce	  a	  useful	  alternative	  to	  or	  better	  drug	  than	  
[the	  existing	  compound]?	  
That	  question	  does	  not	  import,	  as	  a	  criterion	  of	  obviousness,	  that	  the	  inventive	  step	  claimed	  would	  
be	  perceived	  by	  the	  hypothetical	  addressee	  as	   ‘worth	  a	  try’	  or	   ‘obvious	  to	  try’.46	  As	  was	  said	   in	  AB	  
Hässle,	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  criterion	  of	  validity	  expressed	  in	  those	  terms	  begs	  the	  question	  presented	  
by	  the	  statute.47	  	  
We	  reiterate	  that	  the	  RTB	  Act	  did	  not	  address	  this	  aspect	  of	  the	  obviousness	  criterion,	  and	  as	  such	  it	  
seems	  to	  us	  that	  the	  statements	  made	  by	  the	  courts	  in	  Generic	  Health	  and	  AstraZeneca	  continue	  to	  
apply.	  Practically,	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  Australian,	  European	  and	  US	  requirements	  may	  have	  
minimal	  effect.	  However,	  there	  are	   likely	  to	  be	  some	  circumstances	  where	  an	  invention	  will	  satisfy	  
the	   Australian	   inventive	   step	   requirements	   even	   though	   it	   would	   not	   necessarily	   satisfy	   those	  
requirements	  in	  Europe	  or	  the	  US.	  
Draft	   Recommendation	   6.2:	   The	   Australian	   Government	   should	   incorporate	   an	   objects	  
clause	  into	  the	  Patents	  Act	  1990	  (Cth)	  (Patents	  Act).	  The	  objects	  clause	  should	  describe	  the	  
purposes	   of	   the	   legislation	   as	   being	   to	   enhance	   the	  wellbeing	   of	   Australians	   by	   providing	  
patent	  protection	   to	   socially	   valuable	   innovations	   that	  would	  not	  have	  otherwise	  occurred	  
and	  by	   promoting	   the	   dissemination	  of	   technology.	   In	   doing	   so,	   the	   patent	   system	   should	  
balance	   the	   interests	   of	   patent	   applicants	   and	   patent	   owners,	   the	   users	   of	   technology	  —	  
including	  follow–on	  innovators	  and	  researchers	  —	  and	  Australian	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  
The	   Australian	   Government	   should	   amend	   the	   Patents	   Act	   such	   that,	   when	   making	   a	  
decision	   in	   relation	   to	   a	   patent	   application	   or	   an	   existing	   patent,	   the	   Commissioner	   of	  
Patents	  and	  the	  Courts	  must	  have	  regard	  to	  the	  objects	  of	  the	  Patents	  Act.	  
The	  concept	  of	   including	  an	  objects	  clause	   in	  the	  Patents	  Act	   is	  not	  new	  –	  some	  of	  us	  (particularly	  
Nicol	   and	  Nielsen)	   have	   endorsed	   the	   inclusion	   of	   an	   objects	   clause	   in	   previous	   submissions,	   and	  
continue	   to	  do	   so	  now.	   It	   also	  makes	   sense	   to	  amend	   the	  Patents	  Act	   to	   compel	   attention	   to	   the	  
objects	  clause	  in	  making	  decisions	  about	  patents	  and	  patent	  applications.	  	  
While	  we	  support	  the	  inclusion	  of	  an	  objects	  clause,	  we	  believe	  the	  wording	  proposed	  by	  IP	  Australia	  
in	  its	  2013	  consultation48	  is	  preferable.	  As	  a	  first	  point	  it	  is	  critical	  that	  the	  objects	  clause	  specifically	  
refer	  to	  the	  promotion	  of	  innovation	  as	  a	  central	  object	  of	  the	  Patents	  Act.	  The	  wording	  proposed	  by	  
the	  Productivity	  Commission	  fails	  to	  do	  so.	  Secondly,	  there	  is	  no	  real	  benefit	  to	  including	  reference	  
to	   follow-­‐on	   innovators	  and	   researchers	  –	   the	   interests	  of	   all	   users	  of	   technology	   should	  be	  given	  
46	   Aktiebolaget	   Hässle	   v	   Alphapharm	   Pty	   Ltd	   [2002]	   HCA	   59;	   (2002)	   212	   CLR	   411,	   441	   [72]	   (Gleeson	   CJ,	  
Gaudron,	  Gummow	  and	  Hayne	  JJ).	  
47	  See	  the	  discussion	  of	  that	  observation,	  particularly	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  decisions	  of	  United	  States	  courts,	  in	  
Andrew	  McRobert,	   ‘Inventive	  Step:	  Obvious	   to	  Try	  Again?’	   (2009)	  20	  Australian	   Intellectual	  Property	   Journal	  
237.	  






due	   consideration,	   and	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	  predict	  what	  weight	   should	  be	   given	   to	   the	   interests	   of	  
these	   and	   other,	   competing	   users	   of	   technology.	   Indeed,	   evidence	   is	   divided	   as	   to	   whether	  
innovation	   is	   best	   facilitated	   by	   encouraging	   initial	   or	   follow-­‐on	   innovation.	   Requiring	   patent	  
examiners,	  for	  example,	  to	  attempt	  to	  balance	  these	  interests	  as	  specifically	  mentioned	  in	  an	  objects	  
clause,	  at	  the	  point	  of	  examination,	  would	   involve	  placing	  an	  onerous	  burden	  on	  examiners.	  Given	  
the	  generality	  of	  IP	  Australia’s	  proposed	  clause,	  we	  submit	  that	  it	  should	  be	  preferred.	  
We	  note	  that	  it	  is	  entirely	  appropriate	  in	  any	  objects	  clause	  in	  the	  Australian	  Patents	  Act	  to	  identify	  
that	  the	  objective	  of	  Australian	  patent	  law	  is	  the	  enhancement	  of	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  Australians,	  and	  
the	  interests	  of	  Australian	  society.	  Australia	  is	  entitled	  to	  frame	  its	  IP	  laws	  in	  its	  own	  national	  interest	  
subject	   only	   to	   the	   specific	   commitments	   it	   has	   made	   relating	   to	   IP	   rules	   as	   set	   out	   in	   the	  
international	  legal	  framework.	  An	  overall	  objective	  of	  promoting	  the	  interests	  of	  Australian	  society	  is	  
in	  no	  way	  inconsistent	  with	  Australia’s	  commitment	  to	  provide	  national	  treatment	  for	  inventors	  and	  
right	  holders	  from	  other	  countries.49	  	  
	  
Draft	   Recommendation	   6.3:	   The	   Australian	   Government,	   with	   input	   from	   IP	   Australia,	  
should	   explore	   the	   costs	   and	   benefits	   of	   using	   higher	   and	  more	   pronounced	   renewal	   fees	  
later	   in	   the	   life	   of	   a	   standard	   patent,	   and	   making	   greater	   use	   of	   claim	   fees	   to	   limit	   the	  
breadth	  of	  patent	  protection	  and	  to	  reduce	  strategic	  use	  of	  patents.	  
The	  Australian	  Government	  should	  seek	  international	  cooperation	  on	  making	  greater	  use	  of	  
patent	   fees	   to	   help	   ensure	   that	   patent	   holders	   are	   not	   overcompensated	   and	   to	   limit	   the	  
costs	  of	  patent	  protection	  on	  the	  community.	  
	  
In	   principle	   we	   support	   the	   concept	   of	   increasing	   renewal	   fees	   in	   the	   later	   years	   of	   a	   standard	  
patent,	  although	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  to	  indicate	  that	  strategic	  use	  of	  patents	  is	  (or	  will	  become)	  a	  
significant	   problem	   in	   Australia.	   To	   the	   contrary,	   patent	   trolling	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   less	   attractive	   in	  
Australia	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons,	  including	  the	  fact	  that	  damages	  awards	  for	  successful	  litigants	  are	  
generally	   low,	  and	  the	   likelihood	  of	  costs	  awards	  against	  unsuccessful	   litigants.	   In	  the	  event	  that	   it	  
does	  become	  an	  issue,	  increased	  renewal	  fees	  would	  assist	  in	  combatting	  it.	  The	  real	  question	  for	  us	  
is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  renewal	  fees	  would	  need	  to	  be	  increased	  in	  order	  to	  deter	  strategic	  use,	  and	  
this	   is	  a	  difficult	  question	   to	  address.	  Detailed	  examination	  of	   the	  effects	  of	   renewal	   fee	   increases	  
would	  need	  to	  be	  undertaken	  prior	  to	  implementation.	  We	  also	  point	  out	  that	  increases	  in	  renewal	  
fees	   that	   make	   patenting	   an	   unattractive	   or	   unviable	   option	   for	   domestic	   innovators	   would	   be	  
undesirable,	   and	   this	   should	  be	  borne	   in	  mind	   in	  making	  any	   changes	   in	   this	   regard.	   International	  
cooperation	   in	   setting	   renewal	   fees	  would	   not	   necessarily	   offset	   this,	   because	   as	   the	   Commission	  
notes	   in	   the	   Draft	   Report	   (pp	   202-­‐205),	   Australian	   patent	   fees	   are	   modest	   relative	   to	   other	  
jurisdictions.	  
The	   explanation	   of	   the	   phrase	   ‘making	   greater	   use	   of	   claim	   fees’	   in	   the	   recommendation	   is	  
somewhat	   ambiguous,	   but	  we	   see	  no	   reason	   to	   significantly	   increase	   initial	   claim	   fees	   in	  order	   to	  
offset	  the	  risk	  of	  broad	  patents.	  The	  Commission	  itself	  points	  out	  (p	  197)	  that	  a	  majority	  of	  patents	  
do	  not	  reach	  their	  full	  term:	  to	  increase	  initial	  claim	  fees	  would	  greatly	  disadvantage	  those	  that	  do	  
not	   renew	   patents	   in	   any	   case.	   To	   some	   extent,	   the	   evidence	   suggests	   that	  many	   patent	   holders	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





themselves	   limit	   patent	   terms	   in	   line	   with	   their	   requirements,	   having	   adequately	   recouped	   their	  
investment.	  
	  
Draft	  Recommendation	  8.1:	  The	  Australian	  Government	  should	  amend	  s.	  18	  of	  the	  Patents	  
Act	  1990	   (Cth)	   to	  explicitly	   exclude	  business	  methods	  and	   software	   from	  being	  patentable	  
subject	  matter.	  
	  
This	  is	  a	  draft	  recommendation	  we	  do	  not	  support.	  The	  exclusion	  of	  business	  methods	  and	  software	  
from	  being	  patentable	  subject	  matter	  is	  bound	  to	  be	  highly	  contentious.50	  As	  the	  Commission	  points	  
out,	  legislatures	  and	  courts	  around	  the	  world	  have	  struggled	  to	  know	  how	  to	  treat	  business	  methods	  
and	   software	   insofar	   as	  patentability	   is	   concerned.	   The	  Commission	   canvassed	  a	  number	  of	   inter-­‐
jurisdictional	   approaches	   in	   its	   Draft	   Report,	   noting	   the	   problems	   being	   faced,	   for	   example,	   as	   a	  
result	  of	  judicial	  decisions	  in	  the	  US	  attempting	  to	  define	  the	  bounds	  of	  patentable	  subject	  matter	  in	  
the	  software	  area.	  	  
But	  in	  our	  view	  there	  are	  problems	  with	  the	  Commission’s	  analysis	  and	  draft	  recommendation.	  First,	  
there	  are	  many	  different	  types	  of	  inventions	  that	  fall	  within	  the	  categories	  of	  ‘business	  methods	  and	  
software’.	   To	   impose	   a	   blanket	   exclusion	   of	   all	   these	   inventions	   from	   patentability	   is	   an	   extreme	  
solution	  to	  the	  problems	  identified	  by	  the	  Commission.	  Further,	  as	  the	  Commission	  identifies,	  there	  
is	  no	  easy	  way	  to	  recognise	  when	  embedded	  software	  should	  be	  patentable.	  	  
The	  Commission	  also	  fails	  to	  recognise	  the	  difficulties	  the	  European	  exclusion	  from	  patentability	  has	  
presented:	  aside	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  consistency	  across	  jurisdictions,	  the	  exclusion	  has	  generated	  a	  body	  
of	   case	   law	   attempting	   to	   interpret	   its	   bounds.51	   There	   is	   no	   guarantee	   a	   similar	   issue	  would	   not	  
arise	   in	   the	   Australian	   context,	   as	   developers	   attempt	   to	   find	  workarounds	   to	   the	   exclusion.	   The	  
associated	  uncertainty	   that	  would	  be	  brought	  about	  by	   the	  enactment	  of	  an	  exclusion	   for	   ‘BM&S’	  
patents	  may	  well	  exceed	  current	  uncertainty	  surrounding	  patents	  relating	  to	  business	  methods	  and	  
software.	  Clarification	  of	  the	  current	  position	  would	  be	  a	  preferable	  option	  to	  wholesale	  exclusion.	  
Earlier	  law	  reform	  inquiries	  have	  consistently	  recommended	  that	  a	  broad	  technology-­‐neutral	  test	  for	  
patentable	   subject	   matter	   should	   be	   retained.	   The	   manner	   of	   manufacture	   requirement,	   as	  
interpreted	   in	  National	   Research	  Development	  Corporation	   v	   Commissioner	   of	   Patents52	  has	   stood	  
the	  test	  of	  time.	  There	  is	  no	  suggestion	  in	  the	  Draft	  Report	  for	  wholesale	  reform	  of	  this	  test.	  As	  such,	  
we	  submit	  that	  cherry	  picking	  certain	  technologies	  for	  specific	  exclusion	  seems	  anomalous.	  
	  
Draft	  Recommendation	  9.1:	  The	  Australian	  Government	  should	  reform	  extensions	  of	  patent	  
term	   for	   pharmaceuticals	   such	   that	   they	   are	   calculated	   based	   only	   on	   the	   time	   taken	   for	  
regulatory	  approval	  by	  the	  Therapeutic	  Goods	  Administration	  over	  and	  above	  one	  year.	  
	  
Before	  commenting	  specifically	  on	  this	  draft	  recommendation,	  we	  note	  that	  one	  of	  us	  (Nicol)	  was	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  See,	  eg,	  Kim	  Weatherall,	  ‘IP	  in	  a	  Changing	  Information	  Environment’	  in	  Kathy	  Bowrey,	  Michael	  Handler	  and	  
Dianne	  Nicol	  (eds),	  Emerging	  Challenges	  in	  Intellectual	  Property	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2011).	  
51	  For	  useful	  analysis	  see	  Anna	  Feros,	  ‘A	  Comprehensive	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Approach	  to	  Patentable	  Subject	  Matter	  
in	  the	  UK	  and	  EPO’	  (2010)	  5	  Journal	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Law	  and	  Practice	  577.	  





member	  of	   the	  Pharmaceutical	   Patent	  Review	  Panel,	   and	  are	  pleased	   to	   see	   that	   the	  Productivity	  
Commission	  has	  paid	  so	  much	  attention	  to	  the	  Pharmaceutical	  Patent	  Review	  Final	  Report	  (‘PPRFR’).	  
The	  review	   involved	  extensive	  economic	  and	   legal	  analysis,	  consultation	  with	  relevant	  government	  
agencies,	   public	   consultations	   and	   consideration	   of	   two	   rounds	   of	   detailed	   submissions.	   As	   such,	  
there	  is	  much	  useful	  information	  in	  the	  PPRFR	  that	  has	  not	  been	  considered	  in	  any	  other	  forum.	  	  
The	   PPRFR	   included	   some	   general	   recommendations	   on	   transparency,	   international	   obligations,	  
international	  harmonization	  and	  an	  objects	  clause	  for	  the	  Patents	  Act,	  which	  have	  also	  been	  picked	  
up	   in	   the	   Productivity	   Commission’s	   Draft	   Report.	   We	   strongly	   support	   the	   inclusion	   of	  
recommendations	  on	  these	  matters.	  However,	   there	  are	  other	   important	   recommendations	   in	   the	  
PPRFR	   that	   have	   not	   been	   addressed	   in	   the	   Draft	   Report.	   These	   include	   the	   establishment	   of	   an	  
external	   patent	   oversight	   committee,	   the	   introduction	   of	   a	   transparency	   register	   for	   therapeutic	  
goods,	  greater	  involvement	  of	  the	  government	  in	  managing	  the	  costs	  to	  the	  Pharmaceutical	  Benefits	  
Scheme	  when	   a	   patent	   relating	   to	   a	   PBS-­‐listed	   pharmaceutical	   is	   successfully	   challenged	   and	   the	  
establishment	   of	   a	   Pharmaceutical	   System	   Coordinating	   Committee.	   The	   PPRFR	   also	   included	  
specific	   recommendations	   regarding	   amendments	   to	   the	   provisions	   in	   s	   117	   of	   the	   Patents	   Act	  
relating	   to	   supply	   infringement.	   We	   recommend	   that	   the	   Productivity	   Commission	   examines	   the	  
desirability	  of	  including	  the	  full	  suite	  of	  PPRFR	  recommendations	  in	  its	  Final	  Report.	  
	  
Turning	   to	  draft	   recommendation	  9.1,	  while	   there	   is	  much	   to	  be	   said	   for	   limiting	   the	  extension	  of	  
term	   to	   the	   actual	   period	   taken	   for	   regulatory	   approval	   (plus	   one	   year),	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   that	   this	  
accords	   with	   our	   international	   obligations	   and	   practice	   in	   the	   major	   pharmaceutical	   patenting	  
jurisdictions.	  For	  this	  reason,	  we	  submit	  that	  the	  Commission	  should	  consider	  the	  recommendation	  
of	   the	  PPRFR	   that	   the	  effective	  patent	   life	  period	  be	   reduced	   from	   the	  current	  period	  of	  15	  years	  
(noting	   that	   there	  was	  some	  disagreement	  within	   the	  PPR	  panel	  as	   to	   the	  appropriate	  duration	  of	  
the	  effective	  patent	  life	  period).	  We	  submit	  that	  a	  recommendation	  to	  reduce	  in	  effective	  patent	  life	  
could	  either	  replace	  or	  supplement	  the	  current	  draft	  recommendation	  9.1.	  
	  
Draft	   Recommendation	   9.2:	  Regardless	   of	   the	  method	   of	   calculating	   their	   duration	   (draft	  
recommendation	   9.1),	   extensions	   of	   term	   in	   Australia	   should	   only	   be	   granted	   through	   a	  
tailored	  system	  which	  explicitly	  allows	  for	  manufacture	  for	  export	  in	  the	  extension	  period.	  
	  
We	  strongly	  support	  this	  recommendation.	  The	  PPR	  panel	  received	  compelling	  evidence	  as	  to	  why	  it	  
was	  detrimental	   to	  Australian	   interests	   to	  prohibit	  manufacture	   for	  export	  during	  the	  extension	  of	  
term.	  However,	  the	  PPR	  panel	  was	  more	  circumspect	  than	  the	  Productivity	  Commission	  on	  the	  issue	  
of	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  recommendation	  of	  this	  nature	  complies	  with	  our	  international	  obligations.	  We	  







Draft	  Recommendation	  9.3:	  There	  should	  be	  no	  extension	  of	  the	  period	  of	  data	  protection,	  
including	  that	  applicable	  to	  biologics.	  
Further,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  international	  negotiations,	  the	  Australian	  Government	  should	  work	  
with	  other	  nations	  towards	  a	  system	  of	  eventual	  publication	  of	  clinical	  trial	  data	  in	  exchange	  
for	  statutory	  data	  protection.	  
	  
We	   strongly	   support	   both	   aspects	   of	   this	   recommendation.	   The	   PPR	   panel	   was	   provided	  with	   no	  
compelling	   evidence	   as	   to	   why	   it	   would	   be	   in	   Australia’s	   interest	   to	   extend	   the	   period	   of	   data	  
protection	  for	  biologics.	  As	  such,	  there	  is	  no	  good	  reason	  to	  extend	  the	  period	  of	  data	  protection	  for	  
biologics.	  
In	   accordance	   with	   the	   recommendation	   in	   the	   PPRFR,	   there	   is	   good	   reason	   for	   Australia	   to	  
participate	  in	  the	  development	  of	  an	  internationally	  coordinated	  and	  harmonised	  system	  where	  data	  
protection	   is	   provided	   in	   exchange	   for	   the	   publication	   of	   clinical	   trial	   data.	   The	   rationale	   for	   this	  
recommendation	   was	   that	   publication	   of	   clinical	   trial	   data,	   once	   the	   data	   protection	   period	   has	  
ended,	  would	   enhance	   transparency	   and	   efficiency	   for	   researchers,	  medical	   practitioners	   and	   the	  
public,	  and	  provide	  a	  social	  benefit	  for	  society.	  
	  
Draft	   Recommendation	   9.4:	   The	   Australian	   Government	   should	   introduce	   a	   transparent	  
reporting	  and	  monitoring	  system	  to	  detect	  any	  pay-­‐for-­‐delay	  settlements	  between	  originator	  
and	   generic	   pharmaceutical	   companies.	   This	   system	   should	   be	   administered	   by	   the	  
Australian	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Commission.	  
The	   monitoring	   should	   operate	   for	   a	   period	   of	   five	   years.	   Following	   this	   period,	   the	  
Australian	   Government	   should	   institute	   a	   review	   of	   the	   regulation	   of	   pay-­‐for-­‐delay	  
agreements	   (and	   other	   potentially	   anticompetitive	   arrangements	   specific	   to	   the	  
pharmaceutical	  sector).	  
	  
We	  strongly	  support	  any	  strategies	  for	  improving	  transparency	  of	  the	  business	  strategies	  employed	  
by	  the	  pharmaceutical	  sector	  for	  extending	  market	  exclusivity.	  
	  
	  





TRADE	  MARKS	  AND	  GEOGRAPHICAL	  INDICATIONS	  
Overview	  
We	  agree	  that	  trade	  mark	  registration	  systems	  can	  generate	  problems	  of	  the	  type	  identified	  by	  the	  
Productivity	  Commission	  in	  the	  Draft	  Report.	  For	  example,	  we	  agree	  that	  trade	  marks	  can	  potentially	  
be	  used	  for	  ‘anticompetitive	  rather	  than	  informational	  purposes’	  (p	  331);	  that	  ‘trade	  mark	  cluttering’	  
can	  be	  a	  problem;	  that	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  that	  marks	  that	  might	  cause	  a	  degree	  of	  consumer	  confusion	  
are	  able	   to	  be	   registered;	  and	   that	  undue	   restrictions	  on	   the	  parallel	   importation	  of	  goods	  can	  be	  
anticompetitive.	  We	   are	   encouraged	   to	   see	   that	   the	   Commission	   has	   sought	   to	   identify	   whether	  
these	  problems	  exist	  under	  current	  Australian	  law	  and,	  if	  so,	  to	  suggest	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  law	  might	  
be	   reformed.	   However,	  we	   have	   a	   number	   of	   concerns	   about	   the	  way	   the	   Commission	   has	   gone	  
about	  the	  task	  of	   identifying	  the	  problems	  that	  exist	  under	  the	  current	   law	  and	  about	  some	  of	  the	  
Draft	  Recommendations	  that	  have	  been	  proposed.	  
	  
Draft	   Recommendation	   11.1	   contains	   a	   number	   of	   sub-­‐parts,	   and	   rather	   than	   addressing	   each	   in	  
turn,	  we	  have	   grouped	   them	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	   specific	   issues	   identified	  by	   the	  Commission:	  
cluttering;	  defensive	   trade	  marks;	   consumer	  protection;	   and	  producer	   confusion.	  We	   then	   turn	   to	  
consider	   Recommendation	   11.2	   on	   parallel	   importation.	   In	   the	   course	   of	   our	   analysis	   we	  make	   a	  
number	   of	   suggestions	   about	   other	   recommendations	   that	   the	   Commission	   should	   consider	  
including	  in	  its	  Final	  Report.	  
	  
Cluttering	  
Draft	   Recommendation	   11.1:	   In	   order	   to	   improve	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   trade	   mark	  
system,	  the	  Australian	  Government	  should:	  
• restore	   the	   power	   for	   the	   trade	  mark	   registrar	   to	   apply	  mandatory	   disclaimers	   to	  
trade	  mark	  applications,	  consistent	  with	  the	  recommendation	  of	  the	  Advisory	  Council	  
on	  Intellectual	  Property	  in	  2004	  [and]	  
• amend	  the	  schedule	  of	  fees	  for	  trade	  mark	  registrations	  so	  that	  higher	  fees	  apply	  for	  
marks	  that	  register	  in	  multiple	  classes	  and/or	  entire	  classes	  of	  goods	  and	  services.	  
	  
These	  sub-­‐parts	  of	  Recommendation	  11.1	  seek	  to	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  ‘cluttering’.	  The	  Commission	  
has	  considered	  cluttering	  to	  arise	  where	  ‘firms	  register	  trade	  marks	  over	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  elements	  
and	  classes	   than	   is	  necessary’	   (p	  332).	  The	   ‘mandatory	  disclaimer’	   recommendation	  appears	   to	  be	  
designed	  to	  address	  the	  ‘firms	  registering	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  elements’	  part	  of	  the	  problem,	  while	  the	  
‘higher	   fees’	   recommendation	   seems	   to	   be	   aimed	   at	   the	   ‘firms	   registering	   over	   a	   wider	   range	   of	  
classes’	   part	   of	   the	   problem.	   To	   our	   mind,	   however,	   the	   Commission	   has	   demonstrated	   an	  
incomplete	   understanding	   of	   the	   nature	   and	   scope	   of	   the	   problem	   and	   this	   has	   impacted	   on	   the	  
utility	  of	  the	  proposed	  recommendations.	  
	  
Looking	   first	   at	  what	   is	  meant	   by	   the	   idea	   that	   ‘firms	   register	   trade	  marks	   over	   a	  wider	   range	   of	  
elements	   …	   than	   is	   necessary’,	   it	   appears	   that	   the	   Commission’s	   primary	   concern	   relates	   to	   the	  
consequence	  of	   registering	  marks	   that	  have	  both	  distinctive	  and	  non-­‐distinctive	  elements.	  That	   is,	  





• a	  trader	  might	  adopt	  a	  mark	  that	  contains	  distinctive	  and	  descriptive	  elements	  (for	  example,	  
a	  descriptive	  word	  represented	  in	  a	  highly	  stylised	  manner);	  and	  
• such	  a	  ‘compound’	  mark	  will	  pass	  the	  distinctiveness	  hurdle	  under	  s	  41	  of	  the	  Trade	  Marks	  
Act	  1995	  (Cth)	  with	  relative	  ease;	  but	  
• the	  rights	  given	  to	  such	  a	  trader	  under	  s	  120	  of	  the	  Trade	  Marks	  Act	  might	  extend	  to	  allow	  it	  
to	  prevent	  another	  trader	  from	  using	  the	  descriptive	  element	  of	  the	  registered	  mark	  (if	  the	  
other	  trader’s	  mark,	  which	  features	  a	  similar	  element,	  is	  judged	  to	  be	  ‘deceptively	  similar’	  to	  
the	  registered	  mark).	  	  
	  
A	  recent	  case	  that	  might	  be	  said	  to	  illustrate	  such	  a	  concern	  is	  REA	  Group	  Ltd	  v	  Real	  Estate	  1	  Ltd,53	  
where	   the	   owners	   of	   the	   registered	   compound	   mark,	   reproduced	   below,	   were	   successful	   in	  
infringement	  proceedings	  against	  a	  company	  that	  used	  ‘realestate1.com.au’	  as	  its	  domain	  name	  and	  
as	  the	  heading	  to	  a	  sponsored	  link.	  
	  
Another	   scenario	   that	  might	   give	   rise	   to	   this	   concern	   is	  where	   a	   brand	   owner	   seeks	   to	   register	   a	  
mark	  consisting	  of	  the	  shape	  of	  its	  goods,	  and	  where	  a	  primary,	  distinctive	  logo	  is	  also	  prominently	  
featured	  on	  those	  goods.	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  primary	  logo	  will	  mean	  that	  the	  mark	  
should	  be	  able	  to	  pass	  the	  s	  41	  hurdle	  without	  difficulty	  (something	  that	  would	  almost	  certainly	  not	  
be	  the	  case	  if	  the	  brand	  owner	  attempted	  to	  register	  the	  shape	  alone).	  The	  presence	  of	  the	  ‘shape	  
and	  logo’	  compound	  mark	  on	  the	  Register	  might,	  however,	  give	  rise	  to	  doubts	  as	  to	  whether	  another	  
trader	  can	  provide	  similarly	  shaped	  goods	  but	  with	  a	  clearly	  different	  primary	  logo.	  
	  
The	  Commission	  has	  identified	  an	  important	  issue	  here.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  it	  is	  an	  issue	  to	  which	  
courts	   and	   hearing	   officers	   have	   long	   shown	   themselves	   to	   be	   alive	   in	   assessing	   the	   ‘deceptive	  
similarity’	  of	  marks	  under	  both	  s	  44	  and	  s	  120.	  In	  particular,	  it	  has	  long	  been	  held	  that	  the	  common	  
presence	  of	  descriptive	  or	  quasi-­‐laudatory	  elements	  in	  the	  two	  marks	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  given	  relatively	  
little	  weight	  in	  assessing	  whether	  the	  marks	  are	  deceptive	  similar.54	  Further,	  although	  a	  case	  like	  REA	  
Group	  might	  appear	  to	  run	  contrary	  to	  this	  line	  of	  authority,	  courts	  in	  infringement	  actions	  have	  at	  
times	  taken	  into	  account	  the	  registered	  mark’s	  reputation	  in	  determining	  ‘deceptive	  similarity’,	  and	  
in	  REA	  Group	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  registered	  compound	  mark	  was	  able	  to	  show	  that	  it	  had	  
a	   substantial	   reputation	   in	   the	   descriptive	   words	   ‘realestate.com.au’	   alone	   helps	   explain	   the	  
outcome.	  However,	  we	  agree	  with	   the	  Commission’s	  general	   concern	   that	  more	  could	  be	  done	   to	  
clarify	   the	   scope	   of	   rights	   given	   to	   owners	   of	   registered	   marks	   that	   contain	   descriptive	   and	  
distinctive	   elements.	   It	   has	   long	   been	   recognised	   that	   one	   way	   forward	   is	   to	   ensure	   that	   in	   the	  
registration	   process	   an	   applicant	   should	   be	   required	   to	   disclaim	   the	   exclusive	   rights	   over	   a	   non-­‐
distinctive	  element	  of	  a	  compound	  mark,	  unless	   it	   can	  separately	  show	  acquired	  distinctiveness	   in	  
such	  an	  element.	  In	  that	  regard,	  we	  would	  support	  the	  part	  of	  Draft	  Recommendation	  11.1	  that	  calls	  
for	  the	  re-­‐introduction	  of	  mandatory	  disclaimers,	  consistent	  with	  the	  Advisory	  Council	  on	  Intellectual	  
Property’s	  recommendation	  to	  this	  effect	  in	  2004.	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  [2013]	  FCA	  559;	  (2013)	  217	  FCR	  327.	  
54	  See	  generally	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  Burrell	  and	  Michael	  Handler,	  Australian	  Trade	  Mark	  Law	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2nd	  	  





It	   is	   not,	   however,	   clear	   that	   the	   above	   scenario	   is	   the	   only	   one	   the	   Commission	   had	   in	  mind	   in	  
making	   the	   statement	   that	   ‘firms	   register	   trade	  marks	   over	   a	   wider	   range	   of	   elements	   …	   than	   is	  
necessary’.	   Another	   way	   of	   reading	   this	   statement,	   consistent	   with	   the	   anecdotal	   evidence	  
presented	   on	   p	   333	   about	   the	   difficulties	   faced	   by	   designers	   of	   new	  products,	   is	   that	  when	   firms	  
seek	  to	  register	  ‘secondary’	  brands,	  such	  as	  shapes	  or	  colours,	  in	  isolation,	  this	  causes	  problems	  for	  
competing	   traders.	   That	   is,	   it	   could	   be	   said	   that	   provided	   that	   a	   firm	   has	   registered	   or	   is	   using	   a	  
‘primary’	   mark	   (such	   as	   a	   word	   or	   logo),	   it	   should	   not	   have	   any	   need	   to	   separately	   register	   a	  
secondary	  brand,	  such	  as	  a	  shape	  or	  colour,	  in	  order	  to	  distinguish	  its	  goods	  and	  services.	  We	  agree	  
that	  the	  registration	  of	  non-­‐traditional	  marks	  such	  as	  shapes	  or	  colours	  could,	  in	  this	  way,	  be	  seen	  as	  
‘unnecessary’,	  and	  can	  give	  rise	  to	  competition	  concerns,	  in	  particular	  because	  the	  rights	  afforded	  to	  
registered	  owners	  of	   such	  marks	  extend	   to	  prevent	  a	   third	  party	   from	  adopting	  as	  a	   trade	  mark	  a	  
‘deceptively	   similar’	   shape	   or	   colour.	   For	   example,	   allowing	   the	   shapes	   of	   bottles	   of	   alcoholic	  
beverages	  to	  be	  registered	  in	  Class	  32	  raises	  the	  prospect	  that	  at	  some	  point	  it	  will	  be	  difficult	  for	  a	  
new	   market	   entrant	   to	   identify	   a	   shape	   that	   it	   might	   safely	   use.	   Allowing	   single	   colours	   to	   be	  
registered	   raises	   an	   even	   more	   pressing	   concern,	   given	   that	   there	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   only	   a	   limited	  
commercially	  viable	  palette	  of	  colours	  available	  for	  use	  by	  traders	  in	  most	  markets.	  
	  
Re-­‐introducing	  mandatory	   disclaimers	  would	   not	   address	   these	   competition	   concerns.	   Rather,	   the	  
issue	  turns	  on	  whether	  the	  current	  provisions	  of	  the	  Trade	  Marks	  Act	  are	  adequate	  to	  accommodate	  
such	   concerns.	  At	   the	  moment,	   this	   issue	   tends	   to	   fall	   for	   consideration	  under	   the	  distinctiveness	  
tests	  contained	  in	  s	  41,	  which	  seek	  to	  accommodate	  and	  reconcile	  the	  needs	  of	  other	  traders	  to	  use	  
a	   sign	   for	   its	   ordinary	   meanings	   and	   the	   interests	   of	   traders	   that	   have	   used	   the	   sign	   in	   the	  
marketplace	   to	   such	   an	   extent	   that	   it	   has	   become	   known	  as	   the	   trader’s	  mark.	  We	  have	  ongoing	  
concerns	  about	  the	  operation	  of	  s	  41	  in	  the	  context	  of	  non-­‐traditional	  marks,	  in	  particular	  in	  that	  the	  
bar	   for	   registration	   of	   shape	   marks	   has	   been	   set	   too	   low	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   Full	   Federal	   Court’s	  
decision	   in	   Kenman	   Kandy	   Australia	   Pty	   Ltd	   v	   Registrar	   of	   Trade	  Marks.55	  We	  would	   support	   the	  
recommendation	  of	  a	  wholesale	  review	  of	  the	  operation	  of	  s	  41.	  	  
	  
However,	   to	   our	   mind,	   there	   is	   an	   even	   more	   obvious	   deficiency	   in	   Australian	   law	   that	   can	   be	  
remedied	  through	  legislative	  reform.	  At	  the	  moment,	  the	  Trade	  Marks	  Act	  contains	  no	  clear	  ground	  
of	  rejection	  of	  registration	  for	  a	  mark	  that	  contains	  ‘functional’	  matter	  –	  that	  is,	  a	  ground	  that	  would	  
form	  a	  barrier	   to	  registration	  even	   if	  acquired	  distinctiveness	  could	  be	  shown	  under	  s	  41(3)	  or	   (4).	  
This	   can	   be	   contrasted	   with	   the	   position	   under	   US	   law56	   and	   under	   the	   2015	   EU	   Trade	   Marks	  
Directive.57	   This	   sort	   of	   provision	   would	   ensure	   that	   shapes	   and	   colours	   that	   serve	   a	   functional	  
purpose,	  and	  which	  should	  be	  available	  for	  all	  traders	  to	  use,	  are	  kept	  off	  the	  Register	  (the	  problem	  
at	  the	  moment	  being	  that	  functional	  shapes	  and	  colours	  are	  able	  to	  be	  registered	  upon	  a	  showing	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  [2002]	  FCAFC	  273;	  (2002)	  122	  FCR	  494.	  
56	  15	  USC	  §1052(e)(5).	  
57	   Directive	   (EU)	   2015/2436	   of	   the	   European	   Parliament	   and	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   16	   December	   2015	   to	  
approximate	   the	   laws	   of	   the	   Member	   States	   relating	   to	   trade	   marks	   [2015]	   OJ	   L336/1,	   art	   4(1)(e).	   This	  
Directive	  entered	  into	  force	  on	  12	  January	  2016	  and	  Member	  States	  have	  until	  14	  January	  2019	  to	  bring	  into	  
force	   laws	   that	   are	   necessary	   to	   comply	   with	   the	   key	   articles	   of	   the	   new	   Directive.	   For	   the	   more	   limited	  
‘functionality’	  exclusion	  under	  the	  original	  Directive,	  see	  Directive	  2008/95/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  
of	   the	   Council	   of	   22	   October	   2008	   to	   approximate	   the	   laws	   of	   the	  Member	   States	   relating	   to	   trade	  marks	  





acquired	   distinctiveness).	   We	   would	   strongly	   encourage	   the	   Commission	   to	   recommend	   that	  
Australia	  adopts	  a	  functionality	  ground	  of	  rejection	  in	  its	  Final	  Report.	  
	  
Turning	   to	   the	   second	   aspect	   of	   cluttering,	   namely	   that	   ‘firms	   register	   trade	  marks	   over	   a	   wider	  
range	   of	   …	   classes	   than	   is	   necessary’,	   we	   believe	   that	   this	   statement	   does	   not	   fully	   capture	   the	  
nature	  or	  extent	  of	  the	  problem.	  The	  focus	  on	  ‘classes’	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  is	  too	  narrow.	  It	  might	  
well	  be	  the	  case	  that	  some	  firms	  have	  sought	  to	  register	  their	  marks	  over	  numerous	  classes	  of	  goods	  
and	  services,	  when	  they	  intend	  to	  use	  their	  marks	  only	  in	  relation	  to	  goods	  or	  services	  contained	  in	  
one	  or	  a	  few	  of	  those	  classes.	  However,	  application	  fees	  are	  already	  determined	  on	  a	  per	  class	  basis,	  
and	   there	   is	  nothing	   to	   suggest	   that	   raising	   such	   fees	  would	  act	  as	  a	   sufficient	  disincentive	   to	   this	  
sort	   of	   over-­‐claiming.	   Moreover,	   such	   a	   recommendation	   would	   have	   adverse	   consequences	   for	  
legitimate	  traders.	  The	  unusual	  way	  in	  which	  goods	  or	  services	  are	  classified	  under	  the	  Nice	  system	  
(in	  that	  very	  similar	  goods	  or	  services	  can	  often	  be	  classified	   in	  different	  classes)	  means	  that	  there	  
will	  be	  many	  instances	  where	  a	  trader	  with	  a	  legitimate	  intention	  to	  use	  its	  mark	  across	  a	  range	  of	  
goods	  and	  related	  services	  will	  have	  to	  make	  a	  multi-­‐class	  application	  to	  get	  the	  coverage	  it	  needs.	  
Why	   such	   parties	   should	   be	   required	   to	   bear	   the	   cost	   of	   increased	   fees	   for	   their	   multi-­‐class	  
applications	  is	  entirely	  unclear.	  
	  
The	   real	   problem	   that	   the	   Commission	   has	   identified	   is	   one	   of	   ‘overbroad’	   specifications.	   These	  
might	   involve	   specifications	   covering	   a	   diverse	   range	   of	   goods	   and/or	   services	   (which	  might,	   but	  
need	   not,	   span	   multiple	   classes:	   a	   specification	   wholly	   contained	   within	   Class	   9	   could	   cover	  
‘theodolites,	  bathroom	  scales,	  DVD	  players,	  and	  fire	  extinguishers’).	  Alternatively,	  they	  might	  involve	  
specifications	  that	  cover	  broad,	  generic	  categories	  (such	  as	  ‘computer	  software’,	  ‘vehicles’,	  ‘printed	  
material’	  or	  ‘clothing’),	  where	  the	  applicant	  only	  intends	  to	  provide	  highly	  specific	  items	  from	  within	  
these	  categories	  (for	  example,	  printer	  spooler	  software,	  camper	  vans,	  brochures	  and	  headscarves).	  	  	  
	  
There	   is	   no	   easy	   solution	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   overbroad	   specifications	   of	   either	   type.	   At	   present,	  
examiners	  have	  the	  power	  to	  challenge	  an	  application	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  specification	  appears	  to	  
be	  unrealistically	  broad,	  and	  ask	  the	  applicant	  to	  ‘require	  the	  applicant	  to	  make	  a	  declaration	  to	  the	  
Registrar’	   that	   it	   is	   using	   or	   intends	   to	   use	   the	  mark	   across	   the	   full	   range	   of	   goods	   and	   services	  
specified.58	   It	   would	   be	   useful	   to	   see	   some	   data	   on	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   this	   power	   has	   been	  
exercised,	  but	  our	   impression	   is	  that	   it	   is	  underutilised.	  We	  would	  also	  support	  a	  recommendation	  
that	   encouraged	   IP	   Australia	   to	   reconsider	   some	   of	   the	   broad	   terminology	   that	   it	   allows	   in	  
specifications,	   particularly	   in	   light	   of	   the	   more	   restrictive	   approach	   to	   broad	   terminology	   that	   is	  
taken	  by	  the	  US	  Patent	  and	  Trademark	  Office.	  	  
	  
We	  do	  not	   consider	   that	   raising	   the	   fees	   for	  multi-­‐class	   applications	  or	  where	   ‘class	  headings’	   are	  
claimed	  is	  an	  appropriate	  response.	  	  However,	  we	  are	  encouraged	  to	  see	  the	  Commission	  identify,	  in	  
Box	   11.2,	   that	   one	  way	   of	   dealing	  with	   this	   issue	   is	   for	   Australia	   to	  move	   from	   an	   ‘intent	   to	   use’	  
model	  of	  registration	  to	  a	  ‘demonstrated	  use’	  model	  (p	  337).	  This	  would	  involve	  moving	  closer	  to	  the	  
US	  system,	  something	  that	  is	  very	  much	  in	  line	  with	  what	  Australia	  has	  agreed	  under	  Art	  17.2.11	  of	  
the	  AUSFTA.	  Two	  of	  us	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  move	  to	  a	  ‘demonstrated	  use’	  model	  should	  be	  taken	  as	  
part	   of	   a	   root-­‐and-­‐branch	   re-­‐evaluation	   of	   how	   issues	   of	   ‘use’	   and	   ‘non-­‐use’	   are	   dealt	   with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  Trade	  Marks	  Act	  1995	  (Cth)	  s	  27(1)(b)	  and	  Trade	  Marks	  Regulations	  1995	  (Cth)	  reg	  4.8(3).	  
29	  
throughout	   the	  Trade	  Marks	  Act,	   and	  we	  would	   strongly	  encourage	   the	  Commission	   to	  adopt	   this	  
approach.59	  
Defensive	  trade	  marks	  
Draft	   Recommendation	   11.1:	   In	   order	   to	   improve	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   trade	   mark	  
system,	  the	  Australian	  Government	  should:	  
• repeal	  part	  17	  of	  the	  Trade	  Marks	  Act	  1995	  (Cth)
Defensive	   trade	  marks	  have	   long	  had	   something	  of	   an	  uncertain	  place	  within	   the	  Australian	   trade	  
marks	   regime.	   The	   system	   was	   first	   adopted	   in	   the	   UK	   in	   the	   late	   1930s	   at	   a	   time	   when	   the	  
infringement	  action	  gave	  owners	  the	  exclusive	  right	  to	  control	  the	  use	  of	  their	  marks	  only	  in	  relation	  
to	   the	   goods	   in	   respect	   of	   which	   their	   marks	   were	   registered.	   As	   such,	   a	   defensive	   registration	  
significantly	  extended	  a	   trade	  mark	  owner’s	   rights	   at	   that	   time.	  However,	   the	   infringement	  action	  
under	   the	   current	  Australian	  Trade	  Marks	  Act	   is	   no	   longer	   so	   limited	   and,	   at	   its	   broadest	   under	   s	  
120(3),	  now	  mirrors	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  defensive	  registration	  can	  be	  obtained.	  Further,	  the	  
minor	   procedural	   advantages	   that	   might	   seem	   to	   accrue	   to	   owners	   of	   defensive	   trade	   marks	   in	  
infringement	  proceedings	  (namely,	  the	  ability	  to	  sue	  under	  s	  120(1),	  rather	  than	  the	  more	  difficult	  to	  
establish	  s	  120(3))	  are	  illusory.	  This	  is	  because	  any	  defendant	  would	  be	  likely	  to	  challenge	  the	  validity	  
of	  the	  defensive	  trade	  mark	  under	  s	  88,	  which	  would	  then	  require	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  defensive	  trade	  
mark	   to	   adduce	   the	   same	   sort	   of	   evidence	   that	   it	   would	   need	   in	   order	   to	   bring	   an	   infringement	  
action	  under	  s	  120(3).	  There	  are	  real	  questions	  as	  to	  the	  ongoing	  utility	  of	  the	  defensive	  trade	  marks	  
regime,	   and	  we	  note	   that	   as	   far	   back	   as	   1992	   the	  members	  of	   the	  Working	  Party	   from	   the	  Trade	  
Marks	  Office	  considered	  that	  the	  retention	  of	  defensive	  registration	  was	  ‘questionable’.60	  	  
We	  would	   support	   a	   review	   of	   the	   operation	   of	   the	   defensive	   trade	  marks	   regime.	   However,	   we	  
consider	  that	  it	   is	  premature	  to	  call	  for	  its	  abolition,	  and	  certainly	  not	  on	  the	  grounds	  identified	  by	  
the	  Commission.	  The	  suggestions	  that	  such	  marks	  ‘represent	  a	  form	  of	  cluttering’	  (p	  339),	  and	  that	  
they	  afford	  a	  ‘deliberate	  method	  to	  hinder	  competition	  and	  prevent	  entry	  of	  new	  firms	  to	  a	  market’	  
(p	  338),	   are	  misconceived.	  A	  mark	   can	  only	  be	   registered	  as	  a	  defensive	   trade	  mark	   in	   relation	   to	  
goods	  and	  services	  that	  the	  owner	  does	  not	  provide	  if	  the	  use	  of	  the	  mark	  by	  a	  third	  party	  on	  those	  
goods	   and	   services	   would	   cause	   consumer	   confusion.61	   It	   is	   hardly	   the	   case	   that	   a	   defensive	  
registration	   for	   VEGEMITE	   that	   covers	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   goods	   such	   as	   pharmaceuticals,	   jewellery,	  
clothing,	  toys	  and	  educational	  services	  forms	  any	  barrier	  to	  the	  entry	  of	  new	  firms	  into	  the	  market	  
for	  these	  goods	  or	  services,	  given	  that	  a	  new	  firm’s	  adoption	  of	  ‘Vegemite’	  or	  a	  similar	  variant	  would	  
be	  likely	  to	  result	  in	  consumer	  confusion	  as	  to	  some	  form	  of	  commercial	  relationship	  with	  the	  owner	  
of	  the	  famous	  VEGEMITE	  brand.	  	  	  
59	  Burrell	  and	  Handler,	  above	  n	  54,	  364–6.	  
60	  Working	  Party	  to	  Review	  the	  Trade	  Marks	  Legislation,	  Recommended	  Changes	  to	  the	  Australian	  Trade	  Marks	  
Legislation	  (1992)	  [1.5.2].	  
61	  In	  the	  language	  of	  s	  185(1)	  of	  the	  Trade	  Marks	  Act,	  the	  test	  is	  whether	  the	  use	  of	  the	  mark	  ‘will	  be	  taken	  to	  







Draft	   Recommendation	   11.1:	   In	   order	   to	   improve	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   trade	   mark	  
system,	  the	  Australian	  Government	  should:	  
• amend	  s.	  43	  of	  the	  Trade	  Marks	  Act	  so	  that	  the	  presumption	  of	  registrability	  does	  not	  
apply	  to	  the	  registration	  of	  marks	  that	  could	  be	  misleading	  or	  confusing	  [and]	  	  
IP	  Australia	  should:	  
• require	   the	   Trade	   Marks	   Office	   to	   return	   to	   its	   previous	   practice	   of	   routinely	  
challenging	   trade	   mark	   applications	   that	   contain	   contemporary	   geographical	  
references	  (under	  s.	  43	  of	  the	  Trade	  Marks	  Act).	  Challenges	  would	  not	  extend	  where	  
endorsements	  require	  goods	  and	  services	  to	  be	  produced	  in	  the	  area	  nominated	  
	  
The	  Commission	  has	   identified	  a	  number	  of	   issues	  of	  potential	   concern	  on	  pp	  339-­‐41	  of	   the	  Draft	  
Report.	  However,	  (a)	  we	  have	  a	  number	  of	  reservations	  about	  the	  recommendation	  to	  amend	  s	  43	  
of	  the	  Trade	  Marks	  Act	  to	  deal	  with	  these	  concerns;	  and	  (b)	  we	  are	  not	  sure	  that	  sufficient	  evidence	  
has	  been	  presented	  of	  a	  change	   in	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  Trade	  Marks	  Office	   in	  assessing	  applications	  
under	  s	  43	  has	  taken	  place,	  such	  that	  calls	  for	  a	  ‘return	  to	  [a]	  previous	  practice’	  can	  be	  justified.	  
	  
Any	   discussion	   of	   reform	   of	   s	   43	   is	   complicated	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   there	   is,	   as	   yet,	   no	   clear	   judicial	  
consensus	  as	  to	  the	  proper	  scope	  of	  this	  provision.	  Specifically,	  there	  is	  authority	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  (i)	  
s	  43	  applies	  where	  the	  possibility	  of	  deception	  or	  confusion	  arises	  because	  of	  the	  reputation	  of	  an	  
earlier	  mark;	   (ii)	  s	  43	  has	  no	  role	  at	  all	   in	  policing	  conflicts	  between	  marks;	   (iii)	  although	  s	  43	  does	  
not	  apply	  to	  conflicts	  between	  marks	  per	  se,	  this	  section	  will	  still	  prohibit	  the	  registration	  of	  marks	  
that	   cause	   consumers	   to	   be	   misled	   or	   deceived	   as	   to	   the	   existence	   of	   an	   endorsement	   or	  
sponsorship	   arrangement.	   Two	  of	   us	   (Burrell	   and	  Handler)	   have	   argued	   at	   length	   that	   the	   second	  
interpretation	   is	   to	   be	   preferred	   because	   other	   provisions	   of	   the	   Trade	   Marks	   Act	   are	   perfectly	  
adequate	   to	   deal	   both	  with	   possible	   conflicts	   between	  marks	   and	  with	  misleading	   suggestions	   of	  
endorsement	   or	   sponsorship.62	   However,	   for	   present	   purposes	   the	   confusion	   about	   the	   proper	  
scope	  of	  s	  43	   is	   important	  because	  until	   the	  scope	  of	   this	  provision	   is	  clarified	   it	  must	  be	  borne	   in	  
mind	  that	  proposals	  to	  amend	  this	  section	  might	  have	  significant	  unlooked-­‐for	  effects	  in	  the	  types	  of	  
case	  that	  were	  not	  in	  the	  Commission’s	  contemplation.	  At	  present,	  the	  best	  that	  can	  be	  said	  for	  the	  
lack	  of	  clarity	  around	  the	  proper	  scope	  of	  s	  43	   is	  that	   it	  causes	  relatively	  few	  problems	  in	  practice.	  
This	   is	  because	  even	   if	   s	  43	  overlaps	  with	  other	  provisions	   that	  deal	  with	  conflicts	  between	  marks	  
and	  misleading	  suggestions	  of	  endorsement	  or	  sponsorship	  (specifically,	  ss	  42(b),	  44	  and	  60)	  it	  is	  far	  
from	  obvious	   that	   s	   43	   adds	   to	   the	   scope	  of	   these	  other	   provisions.	   If,	   however,	   s	   43	  were	   to	   be	  
amended	  in	  some	  significant	  way,	  including	  by	  removing	  it	  from	  the	  purview	  of	  the	  presumption	  of	  
registrability,	   this	  might	  have	  unforeseen	  consequences	   in	   cases	   that	   the	  Commission	  clearly	  does	  
not	  have	  in	  mind.	  Consequently,	  we	  think	  that	  any	  suggestion	  to	  amend	  s	  43	  would	  be	  unwise	  unless	  
and	  until	   the	   scope	  of	   this	  provision	   is	   clarified,	   ideally	  by	   confining	   the	   scope	  of	   this	  provision	   to	  
cases	  where	  the	  applicant’s	  mark	  is	  ‘of	  such	  a	  nature	  as	  to	  deceive	  the	  public	  as	  to	  things	  such	  as	  the	  
nature,	  quality	  or	  geographical	  origin	  of	  the	  goods	  or	  services’.63	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Moreover,	  even	   if	   the	  scope	  of	  s	  43	  were	  narrowed	  we	  would	  still	  have	  three	  further	  reservations	  
about	  the	  Commission’s	  recommendations.	  The	  first	  such	  reservation	  is	  that	  removing	  s	  43	  from	  the	  
purview	   of	   the	   presumption	   of	   registrability	   would	   have	   a	   much	   less	   dramatic	   impact	   that	   the	  
Commission	  seems	   to	  have	  understood.	  Contrary	   to	  what	   is	  often	  assumed,	   the	  presumption	  only	  
has	   work	   to	   do	   in	   a	   very	   small	   number	   of	   cases,	   such	   that	   taking	   s	   43	   outside	   the	   scope	   of	   the	  
presumption	  ought	   logically	   to	  have	  very	   little	  bearing	  on	   the	   types	  of	  mark	   that	  are	  accepted	   for	  
registration	  (although	  we	  accept	  that	  as	  a	  practical	  matter	  such	  a	  reform	  would	  have	  signalling	  effect	  
to	  IP	  Australia,	  the	  impact	  of	  which	  is	  harder	  to	  predict).64	  	  
	  
Our	  second	  reservation	  is	  that	  the	  Commission’s	  proposal	  fails	  to	  reflect	  the	  complexity	  of	  some	  of	  
the	  issues	  attached	  to	  trade	  marks	  containing	  geographical	  place	  names.	  The	  Commission	  notes	  that	  
‘[t]he	  shift	  by	  consumers	  to	  demand	  more	  locally	  sourced	  food	  and	  beverages	  provides	  an	  incentive	  
for	  firms	  to	  brand	  their	  goods	  to	  reflect	  such	  a	  desire’	  (p	  340)	  and	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  consider	  examples	  
of	   where	   food	   and	   beverage	   manufacturers	   have	   engaged	   in	   conduct	   that	   might	   be	   considered	  
misleading.	   However,	   the	   Commission’s	   final	   recommendations	   are	   not	   limited	   to	   the	   food	   and	  
beverage	   sector	   and	   the	   suggestion	   that	   there	   should	   be	   a	   universal	   practice	   of	   including	  
‘endorsements	   that	   require	   the	  goods	  and	  services	  defined	  under	   the	  mark	   to	  be	  produced	   in	   the	  
region	  nominated’	   (p	  341)	  would	  be	  unworkable.	  The	  Commission	  cannot	  be	   intending	   to	   suggest	  
that	   henceforth	   Oxford	   University	   Press	   ought	   no	   longer	   to	   be	   entitled	   to	   publish	   books	   in	  
Melbourne	  or	  that	  the	  Bank	  of	  Queensland	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  able	  to	  open	  branches	   in	  other	  States	  
and	   Territories.	   Furthermore,	   even	   in	   the	   food	   and	   beverage	   sector	   consumer	   reaction	   can	   be	  
complicated	  and	  difficult	  to	  predict	  and	  we	  are	  therefore	  unconvinced	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  address	  
the	  problem	  that	  the	  Commission	  has	  identified	  through	  the	  trade	  mark	  system.	  The	  ACCC	  appears	  
to	   be	   doing	   a	   good	   job	   of	   addressing	   egregious	   cases	   of	   consumers	   being	   misled	   and	   it	   may	   be	  
necessary	  to	  continue	  relying	  on	  the	  ACCC	  going	  forward.	  	  
	  
Our	   third	   reservation	  about	   the	  Commission’s	  proposals	   relates	   to	   the	  underlying	  claim	  that	   there	  
has	  been	  a	  change	  in	  Office	  in	  practice	  ‘around	  15	  years	  ago’.	  While	  we	  understand	  that	  this	  change	  
in	  practice	  was	  communicated	  by	   IP	  Australia	   (p	  341)	   it	   is	  not	  clear	  to	  external	  observers	  how	  this	  
change	  has	  manifested	  itself	  –	  it	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  reflected	  in	  decisions	  of	  hearing	  officers	  or	  in	  
the	   Trade	   Marks	   Office	   Manual	   of	   Practice	   and	   Procedure.	   More	   information	   would	   need	   to	   be	  
provided	  about	  the	  change	  that	  has	  occurred	  and	  what	  motivated	  it	  before	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  engage	  
fully	  with	  this	  element	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  proposals.	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Draft	  Recommendation	  11.1:	  IP	  Australia	  should:	  
• in	   conjunction	  with	   the	   Australian	   Securities	   and	   Investments	   Commission,	   link	   the	  
Australian	  Trade	  Mark	  On-­‐line	  Search	  System	  database	  with	  the	  business	  registration	  
portal,	  including	  to	  ensure	  a	  warning	  if	  a	  registration	  may	  infringe	  an	  existing	  trade	  
mark,	  and	  to	  allow	  for	  searches	  of	  disclaimers	  and	  endorsements.	  
	  
We	  support	  the	  general	  idea	  of	  creating	  stronger	  informational	  ‘links’	  between	  ATMOSS	  and	  ASIC’s	  
business	   name	   registration	   system	   in	   order	   to	   reduce	   confusion	   amongst	   traders.	   It	   is	   clearly	  
advisable	   for	  applicants	   for	  registration	  of	  a	  business	  name	  to	  be	   informed	  of	   the	  existence	  of	   the	  
registered	  trade	  mark	  system,	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  trade	  mark	  and	  business	  name	  regimes,	  
and	   the	   fact	   that	   ownership	   of	   a	   business	   name	   does	   not	   provide	   a	   defence	   to	   trade	   mark	  
infringement.	   Such	   applicants	   should	   be	   encouraged	   to	   do	   what	   they	   can	   to	   ensure	   that	   their	  
proposed	  business	  names	  do	  not	  conflict	  with	  registered	  trade	  marks	  or	  marks	  in	  which	  third	  parties	  
have	   rights:	   they	   should,	   in	   particular,	   be	  made	   aware	   of	   ATMOSS	   and	   any	   service	   (such	   as	   ‘TM	  
Check’)	  that	  might	  assist	  them	  in	  identifying	  earlier	  conflicting	  trade	  marks.	  
	  
However,	   we	   do	   not	   agree	   with	   the	   Commission’s	   recommendation	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   the	   ‘link’	  
being	   contemplated	   is	   a	   technical	   one	   (between	   the	  ASIC	  portal	   and	  ATMOSS),	  with	   the	   intention	  
that	   applicants	   for	   business	   name	   registration	   would	   somehow	   be	   automatically	   notified	   if	   their	  
mark	  is	  likely	  to	  infringe	  another’s	  registered	  mark.	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  recommendation	  is	  that	  it	  
overlooks	   the	   complexity	   involved	   in	  determining	  whether	  a	  mark	   is	   likely	   to	   infringe	  a	   registered	  
mark.	   In	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   cases	   this	   will	   turn	   on	   an	   assessment	   of	   whether	   marks	   are	  
‘substantially	  identical’	  or	  ‘deceptively	  similar’	  to	  each	  other,	  which	  often	  involves	  difficult	  questions	  
of	   fact	  and	   law.	  Even	   if	   this	  determination	  of	  a	  sufficiently	  similar	  mark	  could	   readily	  be	  made,	  an	  
assessment	  of	  whether	  the	  applicant’s	  name	  might	  infringe	  would	  also	  require	  knowing	  with	  some	  
degree	  of	  precision	  the	  goods	  and/or	  services	   in	  respect	  of	  which	  the	  applicant	   for	  business	  name	  
registration	   is	  using	  or	   intends	  to	  use	   its	  name.	  Based	  on	  that	   information,	  a	  determination	  would	  
then	  need	  to	  be	  made	  as	  to	  whether	  those	  goods/services	  are	  ‘similar’	  or	  ‘closely	  related’	  to	  those	  in	  
respect	  of	  which	  the	  conflicting	  mark	  is	  registered.	  These	  are	  not	  matters	  that	  can	  be	  reduced	  to	  an	  
algorithm,	  and	  any	  attempt	  to	  do	  so	  would	  generate	  too	  many	  false	  positives	  and	  false	  negatives	  for	  
the	   system	   to	   be	   worthwhile.	   The	   suggestion	   that	   the	   ACCC	   would	   be	   well	   placed	   to	   determine	  
criteria	  to	  judge	  when	  a	  name	  is	  likely	  to	  infringe	  is	  inappropriate,	  not	  least	  because	  the	  standard	  of	  
‘misleading	  or	  deceptive	  conduct’	  under	  the	  Australian	  Consumer	  Law	  (with	  which	  the	  ACCC	  is	  likely	  
to	  be	  familiar)	  differs	  substantially	   from	  the	  test	   for	   ‘deceptively	  similarity’	  under	  the	  Trade	  Marks	  
Act.	  	  
	  
Given	  the	  complexities	  involved	  in	  searching	  for	  earlier	  conflicting	  trade	  marks,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  
is	   a	  matter	   best	   determined	   through	   reliance	   on	   human	   expertise,	   the	   best	   reform	   option	  would	  
seem	   to	   be	   for	   applicants	   for	   registration	   of	   a	   business	   name	   to	   be	   strongly	   encouraged	   to	   seek	  
independent	  advice	  from	  a	  solicitor	  or	  trade	  marks	  attorney	  as	  to	  the	  potential	  for	  conflict	  with	  an	  






As	  a	  separate	  point,	  we	  would	  add	  that	  stronger	  links	  also	  need	  to	  be	  made	  between	  the	  registered	  




Draft	  Recommendation	  11.2:	  The	  Australian	  Government	  should	  amend	  s.	  123	  of	  the	  Trade	  
Marks	  Act	   1995	   (Cth)	   to	   ensure	   that	   parallel	   imports	   of	  marked	   goods	   do	   not	   infringe	   an	  
Australian	   registered	   trade	   mark	   provided	   that	   the	   marked	   good	   has	   been	   brought	   to	  
market	  elsewhere	  by	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  mark	  or	  its	  licensee.	  Section	  97A	  of	  the	  Trade	  Marks	  
Act	  2002	  (New	  Zealand)	  could	  serve	  as	  a	  model	  clause	  in	  this	  regard.	  
	  
We	   are	   pleased	   to	   see	   that	   the	   Productivity	   Commission	   has	   recognised	   the	   significant	   problems	  
with	  the	  current	  state	  of	  Australian	  trade	  mark	  law	  as	  it	  impacts	  on	  the	  parallel	  importation	  of	  trade	  
marked	   goods.	   Two	  of	   us	   (Burrell	   and	  Handler)	   have	  made	   detailed	   arguments	   in	   a	   recent	   article	  
about	  the	  long-­‐standing	  problems	  with	  s	  123	  of	  the	  Trade	  Marks	  Act	  and	  the	  judicial	  interpretation	  
of	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Act	  that	  impact	  on	  parallel	  importation,	  and	  we	  refer	  the	  Commission	  to	  the	  
arguments	  and	  reform	  proposals	  contained	  in	  that	  article.66	  
	  
We	   note	   that	   the	   Commission	   believes	   that	   reform	  of	   the	  Australian	   law	   could	   take	   a	   number	   of	  
forms,	  including	  ‘one	  that	  clarifies	  how	  “use	  of	  a	  mark”	  and	  “consent	  of	  ownership”	  applies	  to	  trade	  
marks,	  and	  adjusts	  such	  terms	  to	  allow	  for	  parallel	   importation’	  and	   ‘one	  that	  spells	  out	  when	  the	  
rights	   afforded	   to	   trade	   marks	   are	   exhausted’	   (p	   347).	   While	   the	   Commission	   has	   expressed	   a	  
preference	  for	  the	  latter	  approach,	  leading	  to	  its	  recommendation	  that	  the	  defence	  to	  infringement	  
contained	  in	  s	  123	  be	  amended,	  we	  are	  firmly	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  s	  123	  defence	  is	  too	  
limited.	  As	  was	  said	  in	  the	  article	  referred	  to	  above,	  ‘it	  is	  inherently	  problematic	  to	  believe	  that	  this	  
is	  an	   issue	  that	  can	  be	  ever	  be	  adequately	  addressed	  through	  a	  defence,	  by	  trying	  to	   identify	  with	  
precision	   all	   the	   circumstances	   in	  which	   a	   defendant	  will	   not	   infringe’.67	   The	  New	   Zealand	  model	  
(which	  seeks	  to	   identify	  such	  circumstances	  with	  precision)	  would	  certainly	  be	  an	   improvement	  on	  
the	   current	   Australian	   position,	   but	   it	   has	   a	   number	   of	   defects,	   and	   will	   not	   provide	   parallel	  
importers	   with	   an	   appropriate	   level	   of	   legal	   protection.	   Put	   simply,	   this	   is	   an	   issue	   that	   requires	  
attention	   to	   be	   re-­‐focused	   on	   the	   ‘use	   as	   a	   trade	  mark’	   enquiry	   under	   the	   general	   infringement	  
provision	  contained	   in	  s	  120.	  We	  strongly	  urge	   the	  Commission	   to	   recommend	  that	  any	   reform	  of	  
the	  law	  must,	  in	  addition	  to	  looking	  at	  the	  scope	  of	  s	  123,	  seek	  to	  clarify	  that	  parallel	  importation	  (as	  
well	  as	  the	  sale	  of	  second-­‐hand	  goods)	  does	  not	  constitute	  ‘use	  as	  a	  trade	  mark’	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  
s	  120.	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  Michael	   Handler,	   ‘A	   Requiem	   for	   Champagne	   Heidsieck:	   Trade	  Mark	   Use	   and	   Parallel	  
Importation’	  (2016)	  26	  Australian	  Intellectual	  Property	  Journal	  110.	  





INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY	  RIGHTS	  AND	  COMPETITION	  LAW	  
Draft	   Recommendation	   14.1:	   The	   Australian	   Government	   should	   repeal	   s.	   51(3)	   of	   the	  
Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Act	  2010	  (Cth)	  (Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Act).	  
The	   Australian	   Competition	   and	   Consumer	   Commission	   should	   issue	   guidance	   on	   the	  
application	  of	  part	  IV	  of	  the	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Act	  to	  intellectual	  property.	  
	  
We	   strongly	   endorse	   this	   recommendation.	   We	   note	   the	   many	   occasions	   on	   which	   identical	   or	  
similar	   recommendations	   have	   been	   made,	   particularly	   the	   most	   recent	   recommendation	   of	   the	  
Harper	  Review.	  Given	  the	  lack	  of	  (evidence-­‐based)	  utility	  of	  the	  provision,	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  argument	  
for	  its	  repeal.	  Equally,	  an	  earlier	  proposal	  to	  amend	  the	  section	  in	  line	  with	  the	  recommendation	  of	  
the	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Competition	  Review	  Committee’s	  recommendation	  would	  receive	  our	  
support.	  In	  either	  case,	  we	  support	  the	  implementation	  of	  guidelines	  by	  the	  ACCC	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  
much-­‐needed	  clarity	  to	  IP	  holders	  as	  to	  when	  their	  conduct	  is	   likely	  to	  contravene	  the	  Competition	  
and	  Consumer	  Act	  2010	  (Cth).	  
	  
	  
	   	  
35	  
IP	  AND	  PUBLIC	  INSTITUTIONS	  
Draft	   Recommendation	   15.1:	   All	   Australian,	   and	   State	   and	   Territory	   Governments	   should	  
implement	  an	  open	  access	   policy	   for	   publicly-­‐funded	   research.	   The	   policy	   should	   provide	  
free	   access	   through	  an	   open	  access	   repository	   for	  all	  publications	   funded	  by	  governments,	  
directly	  or	   through	   university	   funding,	   within	   12	  months	   of	   publication.	   The	   policy	   should	  
minimise	   exemptions.	  
The	   Australian	   Government	   should	   seek	   to	   establish	   the	   same	   policy	   for	   international	  
agencies	   to	   which	   it	   is	   a	   contributory	   funder,	   but	   which	   still	   charge	   for	   their	  
publications,	  such	  as	  the	  Organisation	  for	  Economic	  Cooperation	  and	  Development.	  
We	   support	   the	   importance	   of	   public	   access	   to	   research,	   but	   would	   add	   certain	   important	  
qualifications	   to	   the	   general	   principles	   stated	   by	   the	   Commission.	   Many	   sector	   policies	   currently	  
support	  open	  access.	  However,	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  noted	  that	  for	  original	  creative	  work	  produced	  in	  the	  
Arts	  and	  Humanities	  (and	  especially	  outside	  of	  STEM	  where	  journals	  and	  conference	  publications	  are	  
most	  common),	  books	  and	  book	  chapters	  remain	  an	  important	  outlet	  for	  research.	  
The	  Excellence	   in	  Research	  Exercise	  2015	  noted	   the	   following	  breakdown	  of	  outputs	  submitted	  by	  
universities:68	  
Though	  publishing	  contracts	  are	  increasingly	  permitting	  authors	  to	  post	  a	  full	  copy	  of	  the	  publication	  
on	  a	  website	  within	  a	  year,	  this	  is	  still	  not	  a	  standard	  publication	  clause	  offered	  by	  international	  or	  
Australian	  commercial	  publishers.	  Authors	  have	   limited	  bargaining	  power	   in	  negotiating	  terms	  and	  
for	  some	  research	  areas	  there	  can	  be	   limited	  choice	   in	  selecting	  an	  appropriate	  publication	  venue.	  
Whilst	  the	  policy	  objective	  of	  making	  publicly	  funded	  research	  freely	  available	  is	  laudable,	  there	  is	  a	  
need	  for	  retention	  of	  some	  flexibility	  in	  implementation.	  Authors	  need	  to	  retain	  control	  over	  outlet	  
choice	  so	  that	  world-­‐standard	  research	  is	  able	  to	  reach	  the	  most	  desired	  readership,	  impact	  where	  it	  
counts	   and	   appropriately	   advance	   the	   reputational	   interest	   of	   the	   researcher	   and	   their	   home	  
institution.	  







It	   is	  also	   the	  case	   that	  many	  commercial	  publishers	  have	  sought	   to	  monetise	  open	  access,	   shifting	  
the	  cost	  burden	  of	  enabling	   free	  access	  back	   to	   the	  sector	  by	  charging	  authors	   fees	   to	  make	   their	  
publications	   available	   in	   an	   open	   access	   form.	   Institutions	   and	   libraries	   already	   pay	   significant	  
subscription	  fees	  to	  access	  these	  same	  publication	  databases	  as	  well	  as	  subsidising	  the	  commercial	  
enterprise	  through	  the	  contribution	  of	  labour	  of	  their	  academics,	  who	  are	  not	  paid	  for	  their	  original	  
submissions,	  peer	  review	  services,	  editorial	  and	  journal	  management	  roles	  and	  recommendation	  of	  
titles	   to	  authors	  by	  the	  publisher.	  The	  practice	  of	  paying	   for	   free	  access	   involves	  a	  kind	  of	  double-­‐
dipping	   into	   the	  public	  purse.	  The	  need	   to	  pay	   for	  open	  access	  needs	   to	  be	  more	  clearly	   justified,	  




	   	  
37	  
INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY’S	  INSTITUTIONAL	  AND	  GOVERNANCE	  ARRANGEMENTS	  
Draft	   Finding	   16.1:	  Model	   agreements	   on	   intellectual	   property	  would	   have	   the	   benefit	   of	  
being	   fully	   transparent	   to	   Australian	   industry	   and	   to	   the	   broader	   community,	   as	   well	   as	  
foreign	  governments,	  so	  that	  all	  stakeholders	  are	  aware	  of	  what	  Australia	  sees	  as	  the	  ideal	  
outcomes	  from	  a	  treaty.	  
Information	  request	  16.3:	  What	  features	  should	  be	  included	  in	  a	  model	  agreement	  covering	  
intellectual	  property	  if	  one	  were	  to	  be	  adopted?	  
We	  agree	  that	  Australia’s	  trade	  agreements	  dealing	  with	  IP	  rights	  in	  the	  period	  commencing	  with	  the	  
AUSFTA	  do	  not	   appear	   to	  have	  been	   informed	  by	   a	   clear	   strategy	  or	   an	   assessment	  of	  Australia’s	  
national	  interests	  in	  the	  area	  of	  IP	  law	  and	  policy.	  While	  AUSFTA,	  like	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  before	  it	  
and	   the	  Berne/Paris	  Conventions	  before	   that,	   is	  built	  on	  a	  model	  which	   seeks	   to	   set	  baselines	   for	  
aspects	  of	  substantive	  IP	  law,	  other	  models	  exist	  for	  IP	  reforms	  that	  will	  assist	  cross-­‐border	  trade.69	  
We	  are	  not	  convinced	  that	  serious	  consideration	  has	  been	  given,	  within	  the	  various	  branches	  of	  the	  
Australian	   government	   involved	   in	   negotiating	   the	   IP	   chapters	   of	   Australia’s	   trade	   agreements,	   to	  
whether	  replication	  and	  extension	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  and	  AUSFTA	  in	  subsequent	  agreements	  
makes	  sense,	  and	  whether	   it	  would	  better	  serve	  Australia’s	   interests,	  and	  Australian	  exporters	  and	  
importers/users	   of	   IP,	   either	   to	   develop	   chapters	   (a)	   with	   different	   kinds	   of	   IP	   commitments,	   or,	  
perhaps,	  (b)	  more	  similar	  to	  past,	  less	  detailed	  IP	  chapters.	  Little	  consideration	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  
given	   to	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   proliferation	   of	   rules	   at	   the	   international	   level,	   in	   terms	   of	   creating	  
unnecessary	  legal	  complexity	  and	  uncertainty,	  and	  policy	  stultification.	  
We	  agree	  that	  the	  process	  whereby	  Australia’s	  negotiating	  positions	  on	  IP	  are	  developed	  is	  opaque.	  
The	  secrecy	  which	  surrounds	  negotiations	  as	  they	  occur	  (for	  example,	  the	  secrecy	  around	  the	  recent	  
TPP	   negotiations)	   operates	   as	   a	   serious	   constraint	   on	   accessing	   appropriate	   expertise	   able	   to	  
dispassionately	  evaluate	  proposals	  in	  light	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  various	  diverse	  Australian	  constituencies.	  
Discussion	   of	   treaty	   texts	   post-­‐negotiation	   have	   failed	   to	   assess	   in	   any	   serious	  way	   the	  merits	   or	  
otherwise	  of	  concluded	   treaties,	  either	   immediately	   following	   their	  conclusion	  or	  after	  a	  period	  of	  
experience	  under	  the	  treaties.	  	  
We	  are	  not,	  however,	   convinced	   that	  a	  Model	  Agreement,	   in	   the	   form	  of	  drafted	   text,	   is	   the	  best	  
mechanism	  for	  facilitating	  a	  discussion:	  not	   least	  because	   it	   is	   likely	  to	  encourage	  the	  repetition	  of	  
unnecessary	   text	   in	   multiple	   agreements,	   perhaps	   with	   small	   adjustments,	   which	   is	   one	   of	   the	  
present	  problems	  of	  Australia’s	   IP	   treaties.	   The	   IP	   chapter	  of	   an	  Australia-­‐Fiji	  Agreement	  ought	   to	  
look	  very	  different	  from	  an	  agreement	  with	  Europe,	  because	  the	  issues	  would	  be	  entirely	  different.	  	  
We	  suspect	  therefore	  that	  public	  discussion	  at	  a	  level	  somewhere	  between	  the	  attempt	  to	  pre-­‐draft	  
detailed	   treaty	   text,	   and	   the	   current	   standard	   of	   rhetorical	   platitudes	   used	   to	   describe	   IP	  
commitments	   in	   treaties	   in	   Australia’s	   National	   Interest	   Analyses,	   is	   more	   likely	   to	   be	   successful.	  
Perhaps,	   rather	   than	   a	   model	   agreement	   as	   such,	   the	   establishment	   (via	   a	   suitable	   process	   of	  
69	  For	  a	  detailed	  discussion,	  see	  Kimberlee	  Weatherall,	  ‘Intellectual	  Property	  in	  the	  TPP:	  Is	  Chapter	  18	  the	  New	  
TRIPS?’	  (Paper	  presented	  at	  the	  Global	  Economic	  Law	  Network	  Symposium,	  The	  Age	  of	  Mega-­‐regionals,	  19-­‐20	  





consultation)	   of	   a	   statement	   of	   principles	   to	   inform	  Australia’s	   negotiating	   stance	  would	   be	  more	  
useful.	  The	  Max	  Planck	  Institute	  has	  published	  one	  set	  of	  principles	  regarding	  IP	  negotiations	  which	  
could	  be	  used	  to	  inform	  the	  process	  of	  establishing	  relevant	  principles.70	  	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	   Henning	   Grosse	   Ruse-­‐Khan	   et	   al,	   ‘Principles	   for	   Intellectual	   Property	   Provisions	   in	   Bilateral	   and	   Regional	  
Agreements’	  (2013)	  44	  International	  Review	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Competition	  Law	  878.	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COMPLIANCE	  AND	  ENFORCEMENT	  
Draft	  Recommendation	  18.1:	   The	  Australian	  Government	   should	   expand	   the	   safe	  harbour	  
scheme	   to	   cover	   the	   broader	   set	   of	   online	   service	   providers	   intended	   in	   the	   Copyright	  Act	  
1968	  (Cth).	  
We	   strongly	   support	   this	   recommendation	   which	   is	   long	   overdue	   and	   which	   will	   finally	   bring	  
Australian	   law	  into	  compliance	  with	  the	  AUSFTA	  –	  more	  than	  a	  decade	  after	  that	  agreement	  came	  
into	  effect.	  
